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A CASE AGAINST INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT 
OF HIGHLY MIGRATORY MARINE FISHERY 
RESOURCES: THE ATLANTIC BLUEFIN TUNA 
David C. H oover* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
International management of highly migratory marine fishery 
resources is a concept whose time has come and gone. 1 Nevertheless, 
remnants of this pioneering form of marine fishery management re-
main today and, when implemented, raise havoc with local and 
regional fishing economies and federal-state cooperative efforts. 
When implemented by member nations, international management 
decisions for highly migratory species have proven to be inequitable 
and unenforceable and result in de minimus conservation benefits. 
Furthermore, of most concern to the domestic fishing industry,2 the 
international management framework lacks certain procedural 
safeguards, such as judicial review, to check abuses in the decision-
making process. 
* General Counsel for the Massachusetts Department of Fisheries, Wildlife, and Recreational 
Vehicles; formerly with the Office of the General Counsel, National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, United States Department of Commerce; Ex-Officio member of the Advisory 
Committee to the United States National Section of the International Commission for the Con-
servation of Atlantic Tunas. B.A. 1972, University of New Hampshire; J.D. 1976, Suffolk 
University Law School. 
1. The Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, 
May 3,1949,1 U.S.T. 230, T.I.A.S. No. 2044, saw its unofficial demise when Mexico withdrew 
as a Contracting Party in 1978. Since the withdrawal of Mexico there have been no interna-
tional quotas for the harvesting of yellowfin tuna and the resource has not been protected by 
the imposition of any other international management measures. The remaining Contracting 
Parties, which included Canada, Costa Rica, France, Japan, Nicaragua, Panama, and the 
United States, may fish for tuna free of international constraints. 
2. Reference to "domestic fishermen" throughout this article applies to fishermen from the 
eastern and Gulf coasts of the United States. 
11 
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Nowhere are the deficiencies of an international management 
framework more evident than in the case of the Atlantic bluefin 
tuna. The continuing international management of highly migratory 
species such as Atlantic bluefin tuna stands in direct contrast to the 
use by the majority of nations of two-hundred-mile fishery manage-
ment zones for all species including highly migratory species. As of 
February 1981, approximately 115 nations, including the United 
States, had declared exclusive management authority over those 
marine fishery resources found within two hundred miles of their 
coastlines.3 In the United States, the Magnuson Fishery Conserva-
tion and Management Act of 1976 (the Magnuson Act)4 established 
United States jurisdiction and management authority over most 
fishery resources within two hundred miles of the United States 
coastline, but the Act exempted highly migratory species of tuna. 5 
The passage of the Magnuson Act attests to the recognition by the 
United States that the performance of international organizations 
created to manage and conserve marine fishery resources has not 
been effective and that the principles behind such schemes are not 
viable. 6 
This article discusses the procedural and substantive aspects of in-
ternational management of highly migratory marine fishery 
resources, using as a model the recent efforts towards international 
management of the Atlantic bluefin tuna. The article contains in Sec-
tion II an introduction to the Atlantic bluefin tuna resource. Section 
III describes the framework, functions, and authority of the Interna-
tional Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT),7 
3. OFFICE OF THE GEOGRAPHER, BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF 
STATE, LIMITS IN THE SEA (1981). Whether the term used by a foreign nation is fishery conser-
vation zone or exclusive economic zone, these authorities regulate species of fish found within 
such 200-mile zones. This figure does not include numerous coastal nations that declare zones 
encompassing less than 200 miles. A large majority of such coastal nations have declared and 
exercise authority over highly migratory species, with the exception of the United States. See 
infra text and notes at notes 38-42. 
4. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). In 1980 the official title of the Act was 
changed to the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act. Salmon and Steelhead 
Conservation and Enhancement Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-561, § 238, 94 Stat. 3300 (amend-
ing 16 U.S.C. § 1801). 
5. 16 U.S.C. § 1813 (1976). 
6. The Magnuson Act contains the following finding: "International fishery agreemer,ts 
have not been effective in preventing or terminating the overfishing of these valuable fishery 
resources." 16 U.S.C. S 1801(a)(4) (1976). 
7. INT'L CONVENTION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF ATLANTIC TUNAS, 20 U.S.T. 2887, T.I.A.S. 
No. 6767 (March 21, 1969), [hereinafter cited as the "CONVENTION"]. The Convention was 
created in Rio de Janeiro on May 14, 1966; ratification was advised by the Senate on March 1, 
1967; ratification by the President on April 24, 1967. 
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the international body which manages this resource. Following is a 
description of United States federal and state fishery management 
authority and its relationship with international management of 
highly migratory species of fish-specifically, Atlantic bluefin tuna. 
Section IV then discusses the 1981 recommendation of ICCAT. This 
recommendation restricted the harvest of Atlantic bluefin tuna in 
the western Atlantic off the east coast of the United States while ex-
empting from its restriction Atlantic tuna in all waters of the eastern 
Atlantic off the coasts of Europe and Africa. The section documents 
how the 1981 ICCAT recommendation was reached without advance 
notice to United States domestic fishermen, and how it was im-
plemented in the United States through federal agency rulemaking 
over the strong and uniform objections by domestic fishermen and in 
violation of domestic procedural law. Section VI documents two 
suits, filed in the Federal District Courts for the Districts of Colum-
bia and Massachusetts, challenging implementation of the ICCAT 
recommendation. This section describes how, based on international 
considerations by the agencies and misapplication of the political 
question doctrine by the courts, plaintiff fishermen in both suits 
were unable to overcome a strong burden of proof and were not af-
forded judicial review of the federal implementation of the ICCAT 
recommendation. 
The article suggests in Section VII that the ICCAT recommenda-
tion was political in nature and ultimately was not in the best in-
terests of the domestic fishermen. Section VIII offers a recommen-
dation to amend the Magnuson Act to include highly migratory 
species such as Atlantic bluefin tuna within exclusive United States 
control. The article intends to show that international management 
of Atlantic bluefin tuna is no longer in our national interest. 
II. THE ATLANTIC BLUE FIN TUNA 
The Atlantic bluefin tuna (Thunnus thynnus thynnus) matures to 
approximately ten feet and 1200 pounds in size.8 For purposes of 
management, the National Marine Fisheries Services (NMFS), an 
agency of the United States Department of Commerce, National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, has categorized Atlantic 
8. NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, NAT'L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, 
U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE, PROPOSED MODIFICATION OF REGULATIONS GoVERNING THE FISHERY 
FOR ATLANTIC BLUE FIN TUNA 8 (1979) [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED MODIFICATION OF 
REGULATIONS]. 
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bluefin tuna by size into young-of-the-year, school, medium, and 
giant tuna.9 The Atlantic bluefin tuna is capable of travelling at 
great speeds, moving through entire portions of the Atlantic Ocean 
from Labrador to Uruguay in the western Atlantic, and from the 
Mediterranean to Sierra Leone, Africa, in the eastern Atlantic. Io It 
is an oceanic species which travels in schools freely from ocean to 
ocean and is capable of living in waters of greatly varying tempera-
tures. l1 
In the United States, fishing for Atlantic bluefin tuna was negligi-
ble until the late 1950's, when the purse seining method of fishing 
was introduced.12 The purse seine method uses airplanes to locate 
schools of fish. The fishing vessel then discharges a powered skiff 
which encircles the school with a net. When the circle is completed, 
the skiff returns the net to the fishing vessel. The net is then pursed 
at the bottom by drawing in a line attached to the net by rings, thus 
enveloping the school and drawing the net and the fish contained 
therein to the fishing vessel. In addition, the commercial expansion 
of fishing continued with the increasing ex-vessel price paid directly 
to fishermen for Atlantic bluefin tuna, primarily by the ever-
expanding Japanese markets. 13 In particular, catches by Japanese 
9. Young-of-the-year tuna weighs 3.9 kg. and averages 52 cm. in length; school tuna, age 1 
through 4, weigh 4-40 kg. and averages 53-133 cm.; medium tuna, age 5 through 8, weigh 
41-140 kg. (females) and 41-157 kg. (males), and averages 134-201 cm. (females) and 134-210 
cm. (males). Giant tuna, age 9 and older, weigh more than 140 kg. (females) and more than 157 
kg. (males), and averages more than 201 cm. (females) and more than 210 cm. (males). [d. at 
9-10. 
10. [d. Scientific opinion however, tends to support the conclusion that Atlantic bluefin tuna 
is composed of two stocks, one in the western Atlantic and one in the eastern Atlantic, with lit-
tle intermingling. In 1980 ICCAT noted the existence of two temporarily and spatially 
separate tuna spawning areas and that "the present evidence ... is toward the hypothesis of 
separate eastern and western stocks with a small and variable interchange." INT'L COMM'N FOR 
THE CONSERVATION OF ATLANTIC TUNAS, REPORT FOR BIENNIAL PERIOD 110 (1980-1981). 
11. PROPOSED MODIFICATION OF REGULATIONS, supra note 8, at 10. 
12. [d. at 14. 
13. [d. The ex-vessel price is that paid directly to the fishermen. In some cases it can be as 
high as $2.50 per pound, compared to the 2 to 4 cents per pound paid for fish prior to the late 
1950's. 
The vast majority of Atlantic bluefin tuna landed in the United States and Canada is ex-
ported to Japan where the tuna is individually auctioned at the Tzukiji Central Wholesale 
Market. There, the price is determined by the general appearance, evidence of damage in 
catching or handling, and proper cooling and storage. The buyer is allowed to remove a small 
portion of the flesh to check for odor, taste, and texture. Most of this tuna then finds its way in-
to restaurants and Japanese sushi bars. Sushi, raw fish served on a rice cake garnished with 
seaweed, nuts, and soy, is a special and expensive delicacy in Japan. Its presentation, texture, 
grain structure of the meat, fat, and oil content are highly valued by those Japanese financially 
able to experience these gustatory delights. COMMW. OF MAss., DIY. OF MARINE FISHERIES, THE 
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longline fishing vessels increased significantly during the late 1950's 
and early 1960's.14 
At about the same time, the recreational fishery for Atlantic 
bluefin tuna began to expand as well. The term "fishery" is general-
ly defined to include a specific biological unit of fish, referred to as a 
stock, categorized both by the type of fishing gear used to harvest 
that unit and by the purposes of the activity. In the case of the early 
recreational fishery for Atlantic bluefin tuna, the harvesting activity 
was conducted by small privately owned sport boats and other 
recreational boats chartered by the general public either individually 
or in groups for the sole enjoyment of searching for, catching, and 
landing a fish as large as the Atlantic bluefin tuna. In many instances 
in the early days, the fish were caught and photographed, then 
thrown back into the water dead. As the Japanese market for Atlan-
tic bluefin tuna expanded, so did the price for this fish. Tuna fishing 
became not only an enjoyable pastime, but also a profitable one; con-
sequently, the number of participants in the recreational fishery in-
creased as well. 
III. MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK OF ATLANTIC 
BLUEFIN TUNA 
This section sets forth the diverse management framework of 
Atlantic bluefin tuna. The discussion begins with the international 
body managing the resource and the United States framework for 
implementing an international recommendation. Next, the fishery 
management authority of the United States federal government is 
discussed. The federal framework presently exempts the Atlantic 
bluefin tuna from its controls. The section concludes with a brief 
discussion of individual state authority to manage marine fisheries, 
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE ATLANTIC BLUE FIN TUNA FISHERY 26-28 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 
ECONOMIC IMPACT]. 
14. The Japanese longline method is a deepwater technique which involves a line that may 
extend for 70 nautical miles on the ocean surface, buoyed with floats and as many as 2000 
hooked and baited branch lines. Japanese longline catches which were maintained and 
reported by the Japanese were 53,308 fish in 1962; 66,838 fish in 1963; 62,636 fish in 1964; 
58,598 fish in 1965, and 21,982 fish in 1966. The Japanese longline vessels operate in waters of 
the northeast and middle Atlantic and Gulf coasts, normally beginning in the late summer 
operating through the winter and totaling approximately 20 to 40 large fishing vessels. A 
"drastic change in fishing effort from one side of the Atlantic Ocean to the other, as had been 
the case with the Japanese, may very well have serious and long-lasting adverse effects upon 
the bluefin occurring in the western Atlantic." PROPOSED MODIFICATION OF REGULATIONS, 
supra note 8, at 7-9. 
16 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 11:11 
including Atlantic bluefin tuna, within the three-mile territorial seas 
surrounding the United States coastline. 
A. The International Management Framework and Its 
Implementation In the United States 
On May 14, 1966, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations sponsored a conference in Rio de Janeiro which 
resulted in the establishment of the International Commission for 
the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT).15 ICCAT membership 
consists of the United States, Japan, South Africa, Ghana, Canada, 
France, Spain, Brazil, Portugal, Morocco, Korea, Senegal, Ivory 
Coast, Cuba, Angola, and the Soviet Union,16 The Commission is 
charged to investigate and study tuna resources and to adopt recom-
mendations in order to maintain the populations of tuna and similar 
fish in the Atlantic Ocean at levels permitting the maximum sus-
tainable catch for food and other purposes. 17 A recommendation ap-
proved and adopted by the Commission, however, is not self-
executing; of itself it has no force and effect. Before it can take ef-
fect, it must be implemented by individual member nations and en-
forced against their own nationals. Furthermore, before a recom-
mendation is approved and adopted by the full Commission, it must 
go through a complicated political process of objections by the 
member nations. 
Basically, a recommendation becomes final for all member nations 
at the expiration of six months from the date of Commission ap-
proval unless within that same period of time a member nation ob-
jects to the recommendation.18 In the case of an objection, the 
recommendation does not apply to the objecting nation; the nation 
has no treaty obligations to implement the recommendation and may 
conduct its fishing activities without regard to any provisions of the 
recommendation as approved by the remaining member nations. 19 
15. INT'L COMM'N FOR THE CONSERVATION OF ATLANTIC TUNAS, BASIC TEXTS 5-7 (1977). The 
Commission structure also includes a Council which acts as the executive body. The first 
regular meeting of the Commission was held in Rome, December 1969, and the first regular 
meeting of the Council was held in Madrid, November 1970. Both meetings focused on the 
operating and organizational structure of the Commission and Council, and the compilation of 
existing biological data on tuna from the Contracting Parties. 
16. [d. at 48. 
17. CONVENTION, supra note 7, at Art. IV, VIII. 
18. [d. at Art. VIII, , 2. The six-month period is triggered from the date of the official 
notification from the Commission transmitting the recommendation to the contracting parties. 
19. After an objection the recommendation is stayed for a sixty day period. During that time 
any other contracting party may present an objection. If an objection is presented by only one 
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The Commission is not authorized to establish an independent 
research team, but is required to use the technical and scientific serv-
ices of its member nations.20 Accordingly, the Commission has 
created a Scientific Committee on Research and Statistics (SCRS) 
composed of biologists from the member nations whose respon-
sibilities include recommending courses of action to take in conserv-
ing and managing Atlantic bluefin tuna. 
From its inception until just recently, ICCAT has approved only 
two recommendations for Atlantic bluefin tuna. These recommenda-
tions, both adopted in 1974, were first, "that the Contracting Parties 
take the necessary measures to prohibit any taking and landing of 
bluefin tuna (Thunnus thynnus thynnus) weighing less than 6.4 kg;" 
and, second, "that as a preliminary step, the Contracting Parties 
that are actively fishing for bluefin tuna ... or those that incidental-
ly catch it in significant quantities shall take the necessary measures 
to limit the fishing mortality of bluefin tuna to recent levels."21 
There were no objections to these two recommendations and under 
ICCAT rules they were to be implemented by the individual member 
nations. In 1974, however, the United States lacked the necessary 
enabling legislation and therefore was unable to transform the rec-
ommendation into law to regulate the fishing activities of United 
States citizens who fished for Atlantic bluefin tuna. 
Thus, the problem presented to the United States in the 
mid-1970's was a legal inability to live up to its international treaty 
commitments as a member nation of ICCAT because it was unable to 
enforce the recommendation against domestic fishermen. The United 
States did, however, make various attempts to implement the recom-
mendations indirectly through other legislation. The federal govern-
ment first sought to implement the recommendation through the 
or less than one-fourth of the contracting parties the party or parties concerned are given an 
additional sixty days to reaffirm their objection. The recommendation becomes effective after 
this additional period except as to the party or parties objecting and affirming the objection. If 
a recommendation is objected to by a majority of the contracting parties it becomes void. ld. at 
Art. VIlI(3). 
20. ld. at Art. V. The Scientific Committee on Research and Statistics (SCRS) is composed 
of scientists and biologists from the member nations and is responsible for compiling and 
analyzing the biological data collected by each nation. Because the scientists are not an in-
dependent unit of ICCAT, each individual tends to bring a national bias from his or her country 
to bear in the scientific work of ICCAT. The Commission is authorized to establish panels on 
the basis of species, groups of species, or geographic area. ld. There is a panel established for 
northern bluefin tuna. 
21. Proceedings of the Third Regular Meeting of the Int'I Comm'n for the Conservation of 
Atlantic Tunas, November 20-26, 1974, Madrid, Spain. 
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United States Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and At-
mospheric Administration (NOAA), under the Fish and Wildlife Act 
and the Marine Migratory Sport Fish Act. 22 These Acts were not 
regulatory in nature and offered no general enabling authority by 
which a federal agency could promulgate a regulation implementing 
the recommendation; consequently, NOAA abandoned this effort. 
Thereafter, NOAA attempted to implement the recommendation by 
declaring Atlantic bluefin tuna to be a threatened species under the 
Endangered Species Act.23 NOAA reasoned that if it were to be de-
termined that the resource was threatened, NOAA would then have 
general rulemaking authority within the Endangered Species Act to 
protect the species' survival and thereby implement the provisions of 
the recommendation. Unfortunately, the scientific record could not 
establish a threatened species categorization for Atlantic bluefin 
tuna. 
NOAA did not approach the coastal states in the Gulf and Atlantic 
regions to solicit assistance in implementing the ICCAT recommen-
dations or otherwise institute cooperative efforts to restrict 
domestic fishing activities within state territorial waters through ex-
isting state legislative or administrative authorities. 24 Nonetheless, 
in 1974 the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, due to an extensive 
and expanding bluefin tuna fishing effort, implemented on its own 
initiative the first Atlantic bluefin tuna regulations in the United 
States.25 
22. 16 U.S.C. §§ 742a-j (1956); 16 U.S.C. §§ 760c-g (1950). The proposed regulations ap-
peared at 39 Fed. Reg. 14,390 (June 24, 1974). NOAA is the parent agency which has the 
rulemaking authority for the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) the federal agency 
charged with the general responsibilities to conserve and manage the marine fishery resources 
of the United States. 
23. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1973). The proposed rule appeared at 40 Fed. Reg. 14,777 
(1975). 
24. The Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs noted: "The disquieting 
aspect of this is that they [NOAA] never solicited cooperation from the states to have them 
tackle the issue." Letter from Mathew B. Connoly to Bill Hicks (Apr. 24, 1975). 
25. Taking, Landing & Sale of Bluefin Tuna (August 8, 1974) (unreported Mass. Reg.). This 
expansion of the fishing effort was generally an increase in participants in the fishery in the 
form of more fishing vessels and more fishing gear in Massachusetts waters, particularly Cape 
Cod Bay. The regulations established a fishing season, a catch quota of two fish per day per 
vessel in the hand gear fishery (rod and reel, hand held line, and harpoon), and a limitation on 
the number of vessels in the purse seine fishery to those vessels operating on a historical basis 
prior to 1974. Massachusetts continues to regulate the purse seine fishery in Massachusetts 
territorial waters in conjunction with the operation of federal regulations. See 322 C.M.R. 
6.04,329 Mass. Reg. 45 (1982). The giant Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery (fish over 300 pounds) 
exists primarily in Massachusetts territorial waters. For example, in 1978, 96% of the total 
United States quota for that year for giant tuna in the purse seine category was caught in 
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Further federal efforts to implement the ICCAT recommendation 
through the Endangered Species Act were abandoned when Con-
gress finally responded to this need by passing the Atlantic Tunas 
Convention Act of 1975 (ATCA).26 Pursuant to the enabling authori-
ty of ATCA, NOAA in 1975 promulgated the first of many regula-
tions implementing the ICCAT recommendations.27 These regula-
tions, established for all United States fishermen, created a fishing 
season, quotas, and licensing and reporting requirements for 
harvesting Atlantic bluefin tuna. As a result, domestic fishermen 
were subject to stringent quotas enforced by the United States Coast 
Guard and Federal Agents of the National Marine Fisheries Service 
(NMFS), an agency within NOAA,28 and were subject to sanction 
through civil and criminal judicial and administrative penalties. The 
quotas were designed to control the major resource management 
problem of overfishing. Control of this problem, however, was not 
achieved through these restrictions. Overfishing continued because 
of the extensive foreign fishing fleet, particularly the Japanese long-
line fishing vessels conducting their activities in the Gulf of Mexico 
and Atlantic Ocean within two hundred miles of the United States 
coastline.29 
The foreign fishing fleet was not subject to the United States 
quotas because, as is generally the case with international agree-
Cape Cod Bay. Letter from Bruce Freeman to Allen E. Peterson, Jr. (May 3, 1979). As of 
1981, approximately one-half of all United States licensed handgear fishermen were Massa-
chusetts residents. NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, STATUS OF NORTHEAST REGIONAL PER-
MIT SYSTEM 2 (1981). In 1978, it was estimated that 90% of all Atlantic bluefin tuna landed by 
United States fishermen was landed in Massachusetts, and a "much higher percentage of ex-
penditures in the recreational segment of the fishery is spent in Massachusetts." See 
ECONOMIC IMPACT, supra note 13, at i. 
26. 16 U.S.C. §§ 971-971h (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Section 971d authorizes the Secretary of 
Commerce, upon favorable action by the Secretary of State, to promulgate "such regulations 
as may be necessary and appropriate" to carry out the 1974 ICC AT recommendation. ld. 
27. 40 Fed. Reg. 33,978 (1975). The bluefin tuna regulations codified at 5() C.F.R. § 285 
would see significant amendments over the next six years, despite the fact that no new 
ICCAT recommendations were to evolve until 1981. Just prior to the 1981 ICCAT recom-
mendation, the management scheme divided the fishery into handgear (handline, harpoon and 
rod and reel), with quotas for each component, and purse seine participants, with individual 
vessel allocations. For a general discussion of this regulatory evolution see NAT'L MARINE 
FISHERIES SERVICE, DISCUSSION PAPER (1979). 
28. See supra note 22. 
29. Concerns were raised by members of the United States Advisory Committee to the 
United States Commissioners at its October 27, 1976 meeting regarding unrestricted foreign 
fishing in the United States 200-mile management zone after a domestic Atlantic bluefin tuna 
closure. "Inquiries were also made by some members of the Committee regarding actions that 
would be taken against foreign vessels that fish for bluefin in areas off the U.S. coast when the 
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ments that are not self-executing, implementation and enforcement 
of the approved recommendations remained the responsibility of 
each individual member nation. The recommendations as im-
plemented through federal agency rulemaking by the United States 
applied only to United States fishermen. Japanese fishermen fishing 
for Atlantic bluefin tuna in waters within two hundred miles of the 
United States coastline were not subject to the recommendation as 
implemented by the United States; rather, they were subject to the 
recommendation as implemented by Japan. As such, violations by 
the Japanese fishing fleet could only be prosecuted by the Japanese 
government. Of course, the same held true for all other member na-
tions whose nationals fished for Atlantic bluefin tuna in waters off 
the coast of the United States. In general, the result of this system is 
that the strength of any recommendation approved by the Commis-
sion lies in the legal force by which it is complied with and enforced 
by each member. 
At the time of the NOAA regulation, the Japanese government 
continued to rely upon voluntary guidelines and programs designed 
to implement the ICCAT recommendations and reduce the Japanese 
catch of Atlantic bluefin tuna.30 Japan had never restricted its fish-
ing fleets to a quota system similar to that established by the de-
scribed NOAA regulation. While accurate statistics of Japanese 
directed and incidental catch rates for Atlantic bluefin tuna are diffi-
cult to discern, the United States in 1977 concluded that the 
unregulated Japanese longline fishing effort of the bluefin tuna was 
of an unacceptably high volume, stating: "[i]ntense fishing currently 
directed by Japanese longliners on the bluefin tuna resource in the 
Gulf of Mexico indicates the development of a situation having 
serious implications both for the viability of the resource and for the 
implementation of the [Magnuson] Act."31 The "serious implication" 
with respect to the implementation of the Magnuson Act was that 
the Japanese, while in the process of catching Atlantic bluefin tuna, 
were also catching in the same net species of fish specifically covered 
season is closed to U.S. fishermen." U.S. Section Meeting with its Advisory Committee and 
Technical Experts, Record of Discussion 3 (Oct. 27, 1976). 
30. Statement of Public Relations Counsel to the Japan Fisheries Ass'n before the Subcom-
mittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment, June 26, 1979. "In a let-
ter to the U.S. government on February 16, 1978, the Government of Japan stated that it will 
cut back on the number of tuna vessels in the Gulf of Mexico so that fishing effort is expected 
to be substantially lower than the 1976 level." Press Release of the Japan Fisheries Ass'n. 
31. Memorandum from Robert W. Schoning, Director, Nat'l Marine Fisheries Service, to 
David H. Wallace, Ass't Adm. for Marine Resources (May 10, 1977). 
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by the prohibitions of the Magnuson Act such as marlins. Thus, the 
foreign fishing effort during the late 1970's not only was undermin-
ing the federal implementation of the ICCAT recommendation to 
prevent tuna stock overfishing, but also was undermining the federal 
attempt to manage other species of fish through the Magnuson Act. 
The following section discusses more fully the Magnuson Act and the 
extent of United States fishery management authority. 
B. United States Fishery Management Authority 
The 1976 Magnuson Act declared United States management 
authority over certain marine fishery resources to a lateral two-
hundred-mile fishery conservation zone.32 The Magnuson Act 
created eight regional fishery management councils composed of 
fishery experts from the federal government, state government, and 
the fishing industry, and charged these councils to develop fishery 
management plans for species of fish found within their respective 
geographic areas.33 The plans are to be submitted to the United 
States Department of Commerce for approval and implementation 
by federal agency rulemaking.34 The Magnuson Act authorizes 
foreign fishing, provided there is a governing international fishery 
agreement between the United States and the foreign government, 
that each foreign fishing vessel obtain a permit, and that the foreign 
government be suject to an allocation for each particular species of 
fish.35 
The Magnuson Act, however, specifically exempts from its applica-
tion highly migratory species of tuna, defined as those "species of 
tuna which in the course of their life cycle, spawn and migrate over 
great distances in waters of the ocean."36 Such tuna were the only 
species exempted from the Magnuson Act's establishment of United 
States fishery management authority within the two-hundred-mile 
zone. The proscriptions of the Magnuson Act are, therefore, not ap-
plicable to the Atlantic bluefin tuna, which has been classified by 
NOAA as a highly migratory species.37 This exemption was incor-
32. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1976 & Supp. IV. 1980). For a discussion of the Magnuson Act 
and its implementation see Symposium on the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 
1976,53 WASH. L.R. 427-745 (1977). 
33. 16 U.S.C. § 1852 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
34. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1854-1855 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
35. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1821-1824 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
36. 16 U.S.C. S 1813 (1976). 
37. 50 C.F.R. § 601.2 (1978) promulgated under authority of 16 U.S.C. §§ 1852, 1854, 1855. 
Also exempted were albacore, bigeye, southern bluefin, yellowfin, and skipjack tuna. 
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porated by Congress to respect the juridical position of the State 
Department that such species of tuna, because of their highly 
migratory nature, may not be the subject of national controls. This 
juridical position allowed the United States to continue participation 
in international fishery agreements such as ICCAT.38 
To completely understand the rationale behind this endorsement 
by Congress of the State Department's juridical position, it should be 
noted that the exemption entailed a direct recognition of the needs of 
the established United States Pacific west coast distant water tuna 
fleets. 39 The Pacific west coast tuna industry, based largely in 
California, consists of large purse seine fishing vessels, referred to 
as super seiners , which harvest primarily albacore, skipjack, and 
38. 
Subsection (d) specifically excludes highly migratory species of fish from the ex-
clusive management jurisdiction of the United States. This is in recognition of the 
wide-ranging migratory behavior of tuna and the need for unification of control pur-
suant to an international agreement. Adoption of controls by a single nation would be 
largely ineffective in managing tuna, even if that nation had a 200-mile fishery 
jurisdictional limit. International management is far more preferable. There are two 
principal treaties which presently apply to fishing for highly migratory species of fish, 
including those within an extended 200-mile fishery management zone: (1) The Con-
vention for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (the 
"IATTC" Convention), effective March 3,1950 (1 U.S.T. 230; T.I.A.S. No. 2044); and 
(2) the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (the 
"ICCAT" Convention), effective March 21, 1969 (T.I.A.S. 6767). The IATTC Con-
vention applies to fishing in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean for yellowfin and skip-
jack tuna and tuna baitfishes. Member nations are Costa Rica, United States, Mexico, 
Panama, Canada, Japan and France. The ICCAT Convention covers all waters of the 
Atlantic Ocean, including the adjacent seas, and regulates fishing for tuna. Japan, 
Canada, United States, Brazil, France, Portugal, and the Ivory Coast are signatory to 
this Convention. Exclusion of highly migratory species from the jurisdiction of the 
United States preserves these treaties. This is also reflective of the U.S. position on 
ocean fisheries jurisdiction being advanced in the U.N. Law of the Sea Conference. 
REPORT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, S. REP. No. 961, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 876 (1976), 
reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT 
OF 1967, at 679 (Oct. 1976) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]' "Since there is no 
justification for coastal nation jurisdiction over such species, this section [Section 103) declares 
them subject to international fishery agreements established for that purpose." H. REP. No. 
948, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1976). 
39. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 374-76 (statement of Sen. Tunney). Senator 
Weicker, chairing a hearing before the National Ocean Policy Study, referred to this section by 
stating: "This exclusion allows our distant water tuna fleet to disregard judicial claims by 
other nations on tuna within their own waters. Present U.S. policy therefore allows our tuna 
boats to enter foreign waters against the will of the claimant nation. A Federal fund, jointly 
shared with industry is then used to pay the fines of the vessels if seized by a foreign govern-
ment." Hearings on S. 1564, Before the Nat'l Ocean Policy Study of the Senate Comm. on Com-
merce, Science and Transportation, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1981) (statement of Sen. 
Weicker) .. 
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yellowfin tuna, using helicopters to spot the schools of fish.40 The 
United States Pacific west coast tuna fishermen travel throughout 
the Pacific and Indian Oceans, often within two-hundred-mile fishery 
management zones of foreign countries. They do not pursue tuna in 
waters of the western Atlantic off the eastern coast of the United 
States. As noted earlier, however, most foreign coastal nations 
presently have established their own two-hundred-mile fishery 
management zones, and most do not recognize tuna as a highly 
migratory species. Unlike the United States, they exercise authority, 
including licensing and harvesting restrictions, over all fish found 
within their management waters, including tuna.41 This situation ob-
viously left little ocean in which west coast seiners could pursue tuna 
unencumbered due to the foreign controls placed on the tuna 
resource by other nations. 
In order to protect the interests of the Pacific west coast tuna in-
dustry and to reinforce the State Department's juridical position 
that tuna, due to its highly migratory nature, cannot properly be the 
subject of exclusively national controls, Congress amended the 
Fishermen's Protective Act of 1954. Under this amendment, if a 
United States fishing vessel is seized by a foreign government, the 
United States pays any foreign fines and penalties and reimburses 
the owner or owners of the fishing vessel the amount of any fine, 
license, fee, or other direct charge.42 This development clearly was 
40. Unlike the Atlantic bluefin tuna, which is exported directly to Japan as an expensive 
delicacy, albacore, skipjack, and yellowfin are canned and find their way into American 
lunches. 
41. "Eighty-seven nations now claim jurisdiction over tuna, which puts the United States 
clearly in the minority along with Japan and Spain." Hearings on S. 1564, supra note 39, at 2 
(statement of Sen. Weicker). 
42. 22 U.S.C. § 1972 (1954), amended by 16 U.S.C. § 403 (1978). There are considerable 
political (fishery relationships) problems with foreign governments, particularly United States 
trust territories. For example, in 1982, Papua New Guinea seized a California-based tuna 
seiner for fishing without a license and confiscated the vessel and catch, collectively estimated 
at thirteen million dollars_ In addressing the House of Representatives on this issue, Con-
gressman McCluskey stated: 
This occurrence points up the outdated nature of our Fisherman's Protection Act 
[FPA] [Pub. L. No. 90-482] enacted in 1967 at a time when the United States actively 
opposed any country's right to claim more than a 3-mile coastal sea. The FPA also has 
an incredibly deleterious and dangerous impact on our relationship with friendly na-
tions who understandably resent what appears to them to be an arrogant and im-
perialistic policy, to wit: what is within our 200-mile zone is ours but what is within 
your 200-mile zone is ours, too, if it is tuna .... Under the Act the United States 
must now prohibit the importation of all tuna into our country from Papua New 
Guinea .... By imposing these sanctions it is expected that operations of two tuna 
companies based in Papua New Guinea will fail. 
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desirable from the standpoint of the Pacific west coast tuna industry 
and was therefore zealously guarded. 43 West coast seiners were able 
to fish for any and all tunas wherever they were found-regardless 
of foreign license fees-backed by federal insurance should they be 
seized and fined by a foreign government for unlawful fishing in 
foreign two-hundred-mile management waters. 
In order to understand the full scope of Atlantic bluefin tuna 
management it is not enough to examine the international and na-
tional management framework. Individual coastal states continue to 
possess traditional fishery management authority within their 
respective three-mile territorial seas. A brief description of coastal 
state fishery management authority and its implications for the 
Atlantic bluefin tuna resource follows. 
C. State Authority 
The Magnuson Act exempted state waters from federal author-
ity.44 Congress, however, included provisions in the Magnuson Act 
by which the federal government could preempt state authority if a 
state takes any action or fails to take any action which results in the 
frustration of federal implementation of a fishery management 
plan.45 Section 971 of ATCA46 authorizes states to promulgate their 
own timely regulations implementing an ICCAT recommendation. If 
a state promulgates regulations within a reasonable period of time 
after an international recommendation, the federal government can-
not issue preemptive regulations unless the Secretary of Commerce 
determines that the state regulations are not adequate to manage 
CONGo REC. H839128 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1982) (remarks of Rep. McCluskey). 
43. Legislative attempts to amend the Magnuson Act so as to include United States 
management authority over Atlantic bluefin tuna have failed. For example, in 1979 Con-
gressman Gerry Studds from Massachusetts introduced H.R. 4357 specifically exempting 
Atlantic bluefin tuna from the definition of highly migratory species in the Magnuson Act. The 
bill failed in Congress, due in no small part to intense lobbying by the west coast tuna industry. 
44. 16 U.S.C. § 1856 (a) (1978 & Supp. IV 1980) provides in pertinent part "nothing in this 
Act shall be construed as extending or diminishing the jurisdiction or authority of any State 
within its boundaries." 
45. 16 U.S.C. § 1856 (b) authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to regulate a fishery within 
state waters if that fishery takes place predominantly within the fishery conservation zone and 
the state "has taken any action, or omitted to take any action, the results of which substantial-
ly and adversely affect the carrying out of a fishery management plan." For a general discus-
sion of state-federal management, see Greenberg & Shapiro, Federalism in the Fishery Con-
servation Zone: A New Role for the States in an Era of Federal Regulatory Reform, 55 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 641 (1982). 
46. 16 U.S.C. §§ 971d-g (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
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the resource consistent with the recommendation. Thus, while 
ATCA provides for federal regulation of the Atlantic bluefin tuna, it 
recognizes, as the Magnuson Act does, state fishery management 
authority in territorial waters. Section 306 of the Magnuson Act47 in 
conjunction with section 971 of ATCA48 leaves no question regard-
ing the authority of state governments to continue to regulate 
fishing within their waters, including fishing for Atlantic bluefin 
tuna.49 
An example of the exercise of coastal state authority is the Massa-
chusetts regulation governing the Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery in 
Massachusetts territorial waters. This regulation was enacted in 
1974, well before the federal government stepped into the area. 
Massachusetts continues to manage this resource in its territorial 
waters in conjunction with federal regulations implementing the 
1974 recommendation of ICCAT.50 Massachusetts also has assisted 
the federal government with its scientific fishing assessments of the 
stock by promulgating an emergency regulation prohibiting the 
obstruction of and interference with such assessments by fishermen 
in Massachusetts waters who attempt to catch the very fish being 
caught, tagged, and released by federal officials. 51 
47. 16 U.S.C. § 1856 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
48. 16 U.S.C. § 971g (1976). 
49. 16 U.S.C. § 971g authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to preempt a state only if the 
state "has not, within a reasonable period of time after promulgation of regulations pursuant 
to this chapter, enacted laws or promulgated regulations which implement any such rec-
ommendation of the Commission." The Massachusetts Division of Marine Fisheries, an agen-
cy of the Massachusetts Department of Fisheries, Wildlife and Recreational Vehicles, has 
rulemaking authority over marine fishery resources. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 130, 
§§ 17(10), 17A (West 1980). 
50. 322 C.M.R. 6.04, 329 Mass. Reg. 45 (1982). On December 28, 1978 a bluefin tuna 
purse seine fisherman filed an action for injunctive and declaratory relief in the United States 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts challenging the validity of that part of 
the regulation that placed a limitation on the number of purse seine vessels in Massachusetts 
waters. The plaintiff's vessel, FIV White Dove, was not an historical participant in the purse 
seine fishery in Massachusetts waters prior to 1974 and therefore could not obtain a permit 
from the Massachusetts Division of Marine Fisheries. See also Taking, Landing & Sale of Blue-
fin Tuna (Aug. 8, 1974) (unreported Mass. Reg.); supra note 25. In the case, White Dove, Inc., 
v. Dir. of the Div. of Marine Fisheries & Another, Civ. Action No. 78-3300-G, the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court, on a certified question from the Federal District Court, upheld 
the validity of the challenged regulation. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1043, 404 N.E. 2d 1169. 
51. 178 Mass. Reg. 65 (1979). The value of the Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery to the Massa-
chusetts economy measured in gross revenue generated annually has been estimated at ap-
proximately three to six million in 1978 dollars. A moratorium of the nature of the 1981 
ICCAT recommendation would have clear economic ramifications to Massachusetts as well as 
other Atlantic coastal states. ECONOMIC IMPACT, supra note 13, at V. This annual figure will 
fluctuate depending on the manner in which NMFS allocates the United States quota to the 
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Thus, the federal government, which implements ICCAT recom-
mendations; the coastal states within territorial waters; and foreign 
nations fishing for Atlantic bluefin tuna in United States waters are 
all responsible in varying degrees for the management of Atlantic 
bluefin tuna found off the United States coastline. The article now 
turns to a discussion of how the recent international recommenda-
tion for management of the Atlantic bluefin tuna was derived by 
ICCAT and implemented by the United States. This discussion 
shows how the potential for arbitrary abuse of the international 
management process was realized in at least one instance, and, in do-
ing so, illustrates the economically and socially disruptive effects 
that international management decisions may have on the domestic 
fishing industry. 
IV. THE 1981 ICCAT RECOMMENDATION: 
PROPOSAL FOR A FISHING MORATORIUM IN THE WESTERN ATLANTIC 
Prior to 1981, only two ICCAT recommendations for Atlantic 
bluefin tuna species had been approved and implemented by the 
member nations. In the United States, regulations adopted in 1975 
implemented the 6A kilogram minimum size limit and set an annual 
domestic quota of roughly 2000 metric tons (mt), determined to be 
the historical level of fishing off the eastern and Gulf coasts of the 
United States. Domestic fishermen subsequently achieved a consist-
ent and stable basis of operation under these regulations. During the 
following years, domestic fishermen and certain politicians con-
tinued to voice concerns over the Japanese longline fishing effort, 
particularly as conducted in the Gulf of Mexico. In the early 1980's 
neither the fishing industry nor the coastal states in whose waters 
the fishery occurred were aware of any contemplated changes in the 
ICCAT recommendations or in the NOAA regulations implementing 
those recommendations. Domestic fishermen conducted their fishing 
business with a reasonable expectation that even if regulatory 
changes were contemplated the fishermen would be notified early 
enough to allow them to adjust operations. The fishing economies of 
the various coastal states had adjusted similarly to the quotas estab-
lished since 1975. 
Within this setting the United States Advisory Committee52 to the 
United States ICCAT Commissioners held its yearly meeting in 
different components of the fishery. Generally, a large handgear quota will result in greater 
revenues generated in the form of gas, charter and party boat fees, and tourist revenues in the 
form of hotel, motel, and restaurant fees. 
52. 16 U.S.C. § 971b authorizes the United States Commissioners, of which there are not 
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Washington, D.C., on October 15 and 16, 1981. The agenda distrib-
uted by NMFS to Advisory Committee members contained no indica-
tion that there would be any action on or major changes to the ex-
isting 1974 ICCAT recommendations or to the present NOAA regu-
lations. 53 At the meeting, NMFS scientists noted that the mortality 
rate of the stock of bluefin tuna in the western Atlantic had stabi-
lized, but that the overall abundance of the western stock apparently 
had continued to decline. In contrast, the scientists concluded that 
the abundance of the eastern stock had stabilized. 54 Despite this two-
stock analysis, the NMFS scientists refused to pronounce categori-
cally Atlantic bluefin tuna as two separate stocks of fish-western 
Atlantic and eastern Atlantic. The scientists concluded that assess-
ing the bluefin tuna as a single Atlantic-wide stock yielded results 
which were unbiased, while separate assessments of the eastern and 
western Atlantic stocks might yield erroneous conclusions. 55 Put 
another way, the scientists simply acknowledged that the present 
single-stock assessments were more accurate and reliable than the 
two-stock assessments. 
On October 1,6, 1981, the Advisory Committee recommended: (1) 
that the United States delegation continue with the present ICCAT 
measure to limit mortality of bluefin tuna; (2) that a United States 
statement on coastal states preference be presented to ICCAT; and 
(3) that the groundwork be established for the possible imposition of 
a moratorium on directed fisheries in known spawning areas. 56 On 
November 3, NMFS issued the United States position to be proposed 
at the upcoming ICCAT meeting. This position incorporated the rec-
ommendation of the Advisory Committee. 57 The record is silent on 
more than three appointed by the President, In tum to appoint an Advisory Committee of not 
more than twenty individuals "from the various groups concerned with the fisheries covered 
by the Convention." Members of the Advisory Committee attend all meetings of the Commis-
sioners, are authorized to review all proposed programs, reports, recommendations and 
regulations of the Commission, and generally to advise the United States Commissioners at 
the ICCAT meetings. One of the three United States Commissioners is also the NMFS Direc-
tor of the Office of International Fisheries. 
53. Letter from Commissioner Carmen J. Blondin to members of the U.S. Advisory Com-
mittee (Aug. 21, 1981). 
54. U.S. Section Meeting with its Advisory Committee and Technical Experts, Record of 
Discussion 3 (Oct. 15, 1981). 
55. [d. 
56. [d. at 2. A "moratorium" is generally a complete fishing ban; in this instance it would 
become a ban in the Gulf of Mexico for vessels that direct their fishing effort on Atlantic blue-
fin tuna that are known to be spawning, the act of producing eggs. 
57. Letter from Comm'r Carmen J. Blondin to members of the U.S. Advisory Comm. (Nov. 
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the events that transpired between November 3, 1981, the date the 
United States position was made public, and November 11,1981, the 
first day of the ICCAT meeting.58 Nevertheless, the actual proposal 
submitted to ICCAT by the United States (NMFS) Commissioner 
was radically different than the proposal reviewed and approved by 
the Advisory Committee. 59 The final recommendation approved by 
ICCAT was for a moratorium for two years in the western Atlantic 
bluefin tuna fishery, with a small quota for purposes of continued 
scientific assessment of the stock. When brought back to the United 
3, 1981). This was the position that the United States led the domestic fishermen and marine 
fishery officials from the coastal states to believe would be made at the ICCAT meeting in 
Tenerife, Canary Islands. The concept of "coastal state preference" has its roots in interna-
tionallaw. As envisioned for Atlantic bluefin tuna, it would entail a single international quota 
with priority allocation for coastal states based on the concentration of the resource and 
coastal state historic fishing rights. Under this approach, most if not all of the quota would be 
allocated to United States fishermen. Mr. George Mannina of the House Subcommittee on 
Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment responded to inquiries from Ad-
visory Committee members that such a position would be contrary to the United States 
juridical position on highly migratory species and pointed out that the United States share 
would not be a unilateral decision. It would appear as if United States foreign policy would 
work both ends by allocating the available quota of Atlantic bluefin tuna in United States 
waters to domestic fishermen. This would effectively remove foreign Atlantic bluefin tuna 
fishing in United States waters without altering the State Department's juridical position on 
highly migratory species. See U.S. Section Meeting with its Advisory Committee and 
Technical Experts, Record of Discussion (Oct. 16, 1982). 
58. One observation revealed by the list of attendees discloses that there were six in-
dividuals with ties to the west coast tuna industry. The distant water west coast tuna seiners, 
however, do not fish for Atlantic bluefin tuna in waters of the western Atlantic off the coast of 
the United States. See NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, REP'T OF U.S. DELEGATION TO 
SEVENTH REGULAR MTG. OF THE INT'L COMMISSION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF ATLANTIC TUNAS 
(Nov. 1981). One could speculate that the representatives from the Pacific west coast tuna in-
dustry were present in order to serve their own ends in protecting the continuation of the 
State Department's juridical position on highly migratory species, which was being questioned 
by Congress at that time. See infra text and note at note 142. To divert public attention from 
proposed amendments to include highly migratory species within the Magnuson Act, these in-
dividuals may have favored the imposition of a moratorium on Atlantic bluefin tuna having 
economic ramifications on the east coast tuna fishermen, which would deflect attention from 
supporting the amendments to challenging the moratorium. As described infra at 152, this is 
precisely what occurred. 
59. During Congressional briefings on the ICCAT recommendation, Congressman John 
Breaux noted: 
Mr. Forsythe initiated efforts, fully supported by me and many other members of the 
Committee to encourage the ... assertion by the United States of a coastal state 
preference at the recently concluded meeting of the International Commission for the 
Conservation of Atlantic Tuna. As everyone is probably aware ... the ICCAT Con-
vention proposed and adopted a radically different measure. 
Hearings on S. 1564, supra note 39, at 2 (Opening Statement of Rep. John Breaux, Subcomm. 
on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Env't) (Dec. 7, 1981). 
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States by its Commissioners, this recommendation came as a total 
surprise to the industry and state governments.60 
The ICCAT meeting which resulted in this recommendation was 
convened in the Canary Islands, Tenerife, Spain, on November 11 
through 17, 1981. The record discloses that a NMFS biological 
report which was prepared for the ICCAT meeting as part of the 
SCRS committee process61 reiterated the uncertainties concerning 
stock structure, but concluded that current evidence supported a 
theory of two separate eastern and western Atlantic stocks.62 Based 
upon this two-stock approach, the report concluded that the western 
Atlantic stock of bluefin appeared severely depleted and recom-
mended that catches there be reduced to as near zero as possible.63 
Noting the decreasing volume of blue fin tuna in the western Atlan-
tic, the NMFS Commissioner, without regard to the two-stock struc-
ture hypothesized in the NMFS biological report, proposed to limit 
the harvest of Atlantic bluefin tuna in the western Atlantic to 565 mt 
annually for a two-year period. 64 Based on Canadian concerns that 
60. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts immediately noted: 
The final result was a recommendation for a two year directed and incidental fishing 
moratorium for Atlantic bluefin tuna which will have severe and far reaching 
economic impacts on the Commonwealth without affording the Commonwealth prior 
opportunity to submit comments, views and scientific, economic or other relevant fac-
tors for discussion and consideration. . . . As such the Commonwealth has been ef-
fectively foreclosed from exercising its legitimate conservation and management 
responsibilities, and from protecting the economic interests of its residents. 
Position of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Jan. 19, 1982). 
The United States Advisory Committee had in the past expressed its concerns to the United 
States Commissioners that it have adequate advanced opportunity to review all United States 
proposals prior to their presentation to ICCAT. 16 U.S.C. § 971b authorizes the United States 
Advisory Committee to "examine and to be heard on all proposed ... recommendations and 
regulations of the Commission." See Charter of the Advisory Committee to the U.S. Nat'l Sec-
tion of the Int'l Comm'n for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, Art. I(C). In 1978 the Ad-
visory Committee emphasized that the: 
Committee wanted to be consulted rather than informed. With regard to position 
development, the Chairman of the Committee endorsed the procedure whereby the 
NMFS develops a draft for the Committee to review in ample time to have input into 
the finalizing of the position prior to the annual ICCAT meeting. The schedule 
developed by NMFS regarding the development of papers on bluefin tuna which will 
be submitted to ICCAT calls for distribution of the papers to the Advisory Committee 
during the first two weeks of September. 
U.S. Section Meeting with its Advisory Committee and Technical Experts, Record of Discus-
sion, 3 (Apr. 26, 1978). 
61. NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, ATLANTIC BLUEFIN TUNA RESOURCE UPDATE, ICCAT 
WORKING DOCUMENT, SCRS 81155 (undated). 
62. Delegation Report of the Meeting of Panel 2 (Nov. 1981). 
63. Id. at 2. 
64. Delegation Report, supra note 62, at 4. 
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the 565 mt figure was not sufficient to sustain the Canadian 
domestic fishery at current levels, a recess resulted in a joint Cana-
dian and United States draft increasing the annual western Atlantic 
harvest limit to 800 mt.65 The draft was approved by the Commission 
and resulted in the ICCAT recommendation for a two-year mora-
torium, with an annual 800 mt quota for continued scientific assess-
ment ofthe western Atlantic stock.66 The 800 mt quota was to be the 
65. Id. at 5-6. 
66. 
Considering that the SCRS Reports show a decrease in the abundance of the Atlantic 
bluefin stock; realizing that an alarming decrease is observed in the abundance of this 
species in the Western Atlantic, whether or not the one or two-stock hypothesis is 
used; bearing in mind the SCRS recommendation on the need to reduce the western 
Atlantic bluefin catch to the minimum level acceptable to the aims of scientific super-
vision; The Commission recommends: 
FIRST: That the Contracting Parties take measures to prohibit the capture 
of bluefin tuna for a period of two years in the Western Atlantic Ocean, as 
defined on the attached map, except under conditions to be agreed upon by 
the Contracting Parties whose nationals have been actively fishing for blue-
fin tuna in the western Atlantic; such conditions to be based on the require-
ment to index the abundance of the stock. 
SECOND: That the Contracting Parties whose nationals have been actively 
fishing for bluefin tuna in the western Atlantic, 
a) consult and conclude such consultations prior to February 15, 1982, in 
order to develop the conditions under which fishing by their nationals 
will be carried out. Until such conditions are developed, directed and 
incidental catches shall be limited to an annual level of 800 MT to 
enable ongoing scientific studies to be continued. 
b) Exchange information amongst themselves on catches on a frequent 
basis, and report such information annually to ICCAT. 
THIRD: That the annual level of catch be adjusted in the western Atlantic on 
the basis of the scientific evidence produced by the SCRS, to insure the 
stabilization or increase of the stock. 
FOURTH: That the adoption of the above measures concerning the western 
Atlantic must not imply any modification in the ICCAT recommendation 
adopted in 1975 concerning a minimum weight of 6.4 kg. adopted for the en-
tire Atlantic and fishing mortality limited to recent levels in the eastern 
Atlantic; this latter measure being extended until a new decision is made by 
ICCAT. 
FIFTH: That the Contracting Parties take measures to prohibit any 
transfer of fishing effort from the western Atlantic to the eastern Atlantic 
in order to thus avoid increasing fishing mortality of bluefin tuna in the 
eastern Atlantic. 
SIXTH: That, with respect to the FIRST and SECOND recommendations, 
the Contracting Parties whose nationals have been actively fishing for 
bluefin tuna in the western Atlantic may agree to implement this recommen-
dation at an earlier date, notwithstanding the provisions of Article VIII, 
paragraph 2 of the Convention. 
Seventh Regular Mtg. of the Int'l Comm'n for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, Letter of 
transmittal from O. Rodriguez-Martin, Executive Secretary, to all Contracting Party govern-
ments (Jan. 21, 1982). 
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combined figure for Canada, Japan, and the United States, the three 
countries determined to be actively fishing for bluefin tuna in the 
western Atlantic. This figure was approximately one-quarter of the 
United States domestic quota at that time, not even considering the 
Canadian or Japanese levels of catch. Split between the three coun-
tries this figure was so low as to effectively prohibit the continued 
domestic commercial fishing for Atlantic bluefin tuna on any mean-
ingful level. 
In order to secure the votes of the eastern Atlantic countries, it 
was agreed to include a recommendation that fishing effort, defined 
by the number of vessels, extent of gear, and amount of fish caught 
from the western Atlantic, not be permitted to transfer back to the 
eastern Atlantic. In other words, despite the new severe restriction 
on fishing in the western Atlantic, no fishing vessels would be al-
lowed to move their activities from the western Atlantic to the 
eastern Atlantic. 67 
More specifically, the ICCAT recommendation authorized Canada, 
Japan, and the United States to establish the final quotas 
themselves, but provided that, in the interim, the combined level of 
fishing for all three countries would be set at an annual figure of 800 
mt.68 The full ICCAT Commission had simply acknowledged that, 
because these three countries conducted the bulk of the fishing for 
Atlantic bluefin tuna in the western Atlantic, they should determine 
the management restrictions without the involvement of the full 
Commission. Pursuant to this apparent delegation of authority to set 
the final allocation,69 representatives of these three countries met in 
Miami, Florida on February 8, 1982, to determine the conditions 
under which their nationals could fish for Atlantic bluefin tuna. At 
the conclusion of the Miami consultations, the governments recom-
67. Apparently, one of the reasons directly underlying the stability of the eastern Atlantic 
stock was the previous transfer of the Japanese fishing effort in the 1960's from the eastern 
Atlantic to the western Atlantic. 
68. Seventh Regular Mtg. of the Int'l Comm'n for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, Sec-
ond recommendation. On November 23, 1981 NMFS issued a Press Release stating: "Under 
the conditions to be developed, total catches for the western Atlantic are not likely to exceed 
800 metric tons." 
69. Letter of transmittal from O. Rodriguez-Martin, supra note 66. There are no provisions 
in the Convention that allow the Commission to delegate its authority to some of the contract-
ing parties to develop recommendations. This point is particularly relevant if the full Commis-
sion membership does not approve a recommendation developed by less than all the contract-
ing parties. The full ICCAT membership never approved the results of the Miami, Florida 
meeting. However, the ICCAT Executive Director did transmit the results of the Miami, 
Florida meeting to all the contracting parties. See infra text and notes at notes 70-71. 
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mended that Canada receive an annual allocation of 250 mt, Japan 
receive 305 mt and the United States receive 605 mt.70 This total 
quota of 1160 mt was 360 mt greater than the interim quota of 800 
mt established by the full ICCAT Commission. In addition, the 
recommendation specifically exempted Brazil and Cuba; those coun-
tries would be permitted to harvest as much Atlantic bluefin tuna as 
they were capable of harvesting. 71 Therefore, the fishing activities of 
only Canada, Japan, and the United States were to be proscribed. 
What remained at this point was for Canada, Japan, and the 
United States to implement this recommendation to be effective for 
70. The recommendation adopted by Canada, Japan, and the United States was as follows: 
FIRST: That measures will be taken to limit the annual catch of bluefin tuna 
in the western Atlantic during 1982 and 1983 to 1160 metric tons (MT) tak-
ing into consideration (1) a review of the status of the bluefin tuna stocks, 
and (2) catch levels necessary to provide data to index the abundance of the 
stock. 
SECOND: That the quota of 1160 MT will be divided among Canada, Japan, 
and the United States as follows: 
Canada 250 MT 
Japan 305MT 
United States 605 MT 
THIRD: That the developing bluefin tuna fisheries in the western Atlantic of 
Brazil and Cuba, which currently take less than 50 MT annually, shall not be 
subject to the limitations addressed herein. 
FOURTH: That during 1982 and 1983 there will be no directed fishery on 
the bluefin tuna spawning stocks in the Gulf of Mexico. 
FIFTH: That the governments of Canada, Japan, and the United States take 
steps to implement these provisions as soon as possible and simultaneously 
in accordance with the regulatory procedures of each country. 
SIXTH: That the matters noted in the recommendations contained in para-
graphs one to five above be reviewed by ICCAT at its Third Special Meeting 
in November 1982. 
Seventh Regular Mtg. of the Int'l Comm'n for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, Transmit-
tal letter from O. Rodriguez-Martin, Executive Director to Contracting Party governments 
(July 20, 1982). 
At the conclusion of the consultation the State of New Jersey commented: 
Just as disturbing is how the United States quota is determined. As best I can deter-
mine, it seems to have been set in place by a document prepared by the southeast 
center which was obviously incomplete in many aspects. This document, as briefly 
spoken about at the ICCAT Advisors Meeting several weeks ago, was quickly 
modified by a very short discussion, more or less by a "barter" situation. As a result 
of that meeting, I am not sure what the quota will be. 
Letter from Bruce Freeman to Carmen Blondin (Jan. 29, 1982). 
71. Brazil, although not a country actively fishing for Atlantic bluefin tuna, nonetheless at-
tended the meeting in Miami, Florida. Noting that the development of its bluefin tuna fishery 
had been "rapid and continuing," Brazil requested special consideration so that the develop-
ment of its bluefin tuna fishery would not be curtailed. Records of the Mtg. on the Western 
Atlantic Bluefin Management Measures (Feb. 8-12, 1982). It would appear to be inconsistent 
with the conservation goal of stock rebuilding to establish a moratorium for the directed and 
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their own nationals who fish for Atlantic bluefin tuna in the western 
Atlantic. The recommendation in and of itself did not have the force 
and effect of law. The following section presents the procedures used 
by the United States to implement this recommendation and the 
response of the domestic fishing industry and the coastal states both 
to the recommendation itself and its implementation. 
v. THE RULEMAKING: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ICCAT 
RECOMMENDATION THROUGH NOAA RULES 
Section 971d of ATCA provides that upon favorable action by the 
Secretary of State the Secretary of Commerce shall conduct hear-
ings and promulgate "such regulations as may be necessary and ap-
propriate to carry out" ICCAT recommendations.72 Therefore, the 
Secretary of State's approval of a recommendation of the full ICCAT 
Commission is a condition precedent to the initiation of the agency 
rulemaking process. Through a delegation of authority from the Sec-
retary of Commerce, NOAA possesses this rulemaking authority. It 
would appear on the face of section 971d that public hearings are re-
quired in order to solicit public comments and concerns on the 
recommendation, and that the regulations promulgated must be both 
necessary and appropriate. 
On April 1, 1982, NMFS73 requested the Department of State's ap-
proval of the ICCAT recommendation developed at the 1981 ICCAT 
meeting in Tenerife. The NMFS request contained no reference to 
the subsequent Miami foreign government consultations which in 
fact constituted the final ICCAT recommendation.74 On April 14, 
1982, the Department of State concurred with the NMFS recom-
mendation of support for the November 1981 ICCAT recommenda-
tion. 76 Again, there was no reference to the February 1982 Miami 
foreign government consultations. 
incidental catch of Atlantic bluefin tuna, while at the same time allowing the continued expan-
sion of Brazil's bluefin tuna fishery. This is particularly incongruous in light of the earlier 1974 
ICCAT recommendation which limited the fishing mortality; including the incidental catch, of 
bluefin tuna to recent levels. Cuba, which has a small bluefin tuna catch, was not at the 
meeting. Although Cuba is a contracting party, it too was exempt from the operation of the 
1981 recommendation. 
72. 16 U.S.C. § 971d (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
73. See supra note 22. 
74. Letter from William G. Gordon, Ass't Adm. for Fisheries (NOAA), to Theodore G. Kron-
miller, Dep'y Ass't Sec'y for Oceans and Fisheries Mfairs, Dep't of State (Apr. 1, 1982). 
75. Letter from Theodore G. Kronmiller to William G. Gordon (Apr. 14, 1982). The official 
ICCAT transmittal letter to the contracting parties was dated July 20, 1982. Therefore, the 
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Meanwhile, underscoring both the confusion and concern ex-
pressed by the domestic fishing industry and coastal states, there 
were two unrelated attempts to secure from NOAA the release of 
certain federal documents which would more accurately explain the 
moratorium than did the press releases issued by NMFS. First, the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts sought those documents explain-
ing how the decision of a moratorium was reached. 76 In addition, the 
East Coast Tuna Association, a hastily organized group of fish-
ermen, sought more accurate information explaining the biological 
crisis that formed the basis for and the need of a moratorium. 77 Both 
were attempts to obtain documents that would reveal the data used 
and the decisions leading to the recommendation. Both requests for 
the documents and data met with little cooperation and less than 
complete success.78 
While the purpose of this article is not to discuss the questionable 
accuracy of the data or the questioned analysis of the data which 
formed the basis for the extremely low stock size estimate in the 
western Atlantic which in turn led to the decision to propose a mora-
torium, it should be noted that, in recent years, the SCRS has 
reached different conclusions regarding the accuracy of the stock 
Secretary of State's approval of the recommendation and federal rulemaking came prior to the 
official ICCAT acceptance of the final recommendation. The official ICCAT transmittal letter 
was dated 7 days after oral argument on motion for preliminary relief filed by plaintiff U.S. 
fishermen in Federal District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Plaintiffs argued the in-
validity of the ICCAT recommendation on numerous grounds. 
76. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts responded with a Freedom of Information Act re-
quest seeking all relevant documents which might explain the immediacy of the problem and 
the need for such a drastic conservation measure as a two year moratorium. See letter from 
Philip G. Coates to William G. Gordon (Nov. 27, 1981). (on file with author). 
77. The East Coast Tuna Association (ECTA), composed of a wholesale tuna dealer, and 
commercial handgear and purse seine fishermen, was organized in an attempt to challenge the 
validity of the biological assessments and the accuracy of the stock structure analyses. ECTA 
requested the biological data used to compute the stock size, and the assessment analyses. See 
letter from Frank Hester to Gerry Abrams (Feb. 19, 1982). (on file with author). 
78. A majority of the documents requested by the Commonwealth were withheld by NOAA, 
based upon exemption (bX5) of 5 U.S.C. § 552. This decision to deny release of identifiable 
documents was appealed to the Secretary of Commerce, and, despite the Secretary's concur-
rence in the applicability of the (bX5) exemption, most of the withheld documents were re-
leased. See letter from Sherman Unger to Philip G. Coates (May 4, 1982). (on file with author). 
ECTA had problems gaining access to the data tapes and the key to the data analysis. The 
most vexing problem was ECTA's difficulty in receiving a satisfactory answer from NMFS 
regarding the starting figure for determining the stock assessment. According to ECTA this 
figure was unnecessarily high and made the crucial difference between a negative or positive 
stock surplus production. ECTA retained the services of Dr. Frank J. Hester, a scientist with a 
PhD. in marine biology and fisheries analysis. Dr. Hester concluded in his letter, sworn and 
subscribed to and filed with the court by plaintiffs, that: 
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size assessment. For instance, in 1980, the SCRS concluded that the 
entire single-stock of Atlantic bluefin tuna was in "reasonably" good 
shape. 79 The difference between that estimate and the 1981 estimate 
was simply the difference between a single-stock assessment used in 
1980 and the two-stock assessment used in 1981. When analyzed as 
two stocks, the very same data produced the different conclusion in 
1981 that the eastern Atlantic stock was stable but the western 
Atlantic stock was not.80 This recognition reveals that the manage-
ment decision for a moratorium was based on a two-stock assump-
tion that admittedly was not endorsed according to the United 
States Commissioners. The two-stock assumption arguably could 
support the conclusion that bluefin tuna no longer migrate over 
great distances but travel separately along the eastern and western 
Atlantic coasts.81 This possibility appears to be the very reason why 
there was reluctance to pronounce two stocks of tuna which were no 
longer highly migratory, for to do so would adversely affect the 
United States juridical position which opposes national controls, and 
would undermine the basis for international management of Atlantic 
bluefin tuna. Such a result would only lend further support to the 
argument that Atlantic bluefin tuna should be managed on a domes-
tic basis pursuant to the Magnuson Act. 
While there were numerous proposed alternatives to the moratori-
um concept, NOAA did not consider any of these proposals.82 Alter-
The question of bias with the assessment may never be resolved. Each time two 
equally plausible numbers could be used in the analysis only the one that gave the 
worst results was used; the other is not even discussed. Further, SCRS 81155 omits 
those numbers from the text and tables, like the unaveraged starting F's, that would 
alert a reviewer to the fact that serious statistical problems exist with the analysis. 
Letter from Frank Hester to Gerry Abrams (Feb. 19, 1982). For a discussion of rulemaking 
made upon questionable scientific data, see McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discre-
tion in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in 
SPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L. J. 729 (1979). 
79. SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE ON RESEARCH AND STATISTICS 80/43, 264 (1980). 
80. SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE ON RESEARCH AND STATISTICS 81155, 5 (1981). 
81. "The western Atlantic stock of bluefin tuna inhabit pelagic waters along the entire Gulf 
of Mexico and Atlantic coasts." NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, NAT'L OCEANIC AND AT· 
MOSPHERIC ADM., FINAL ENVT'L IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE UNITED STATES ATLANTIC 
BLUE FIN TUNA FISHERY V (May, 1982) [hereinafter cited as FEIS]. 
82. Regarding comments that the rulemaking consider bluefin tuna management under the 
Magnuson Act, NMFS responded that "such action . . . is not within the authority conferred 
by the Atlantic Tunas Convention Act, which is the legal authority for this rulemaking." 47 
Fed. Reg. 25,351 (1982). In response to a comment that the definition of highly migratory 
species appearing at 50 C.F.R. 601.2 be amended to exclude bluefin tuna, the agency re-
sponded: "[r]evising the list would not be consistent with the Magnuson Act, and would not ac-
complish timely implementation of the ICCAT recommendation." Id. In response to numerous 
comments that the 1981 regulations remain in place and that the U.S. exercise its treaty objec-
36 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 11:11 
natives to the proposed action deliberately were not discussed in the 
Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS), as they were con-
sidered by NOAA to run counter to the international commitments 
of the United States.83 After holding the required public hearings, 
which elicited strong and uniform opposition from the domestic 
fishing industry and coastal states, NOAA issued its final rule on 
June 11, 1982, implementing the ICCAT recommendation.84 
The rule was determined by NOAA not to be "major," despite its 
estimated negative impact of fourteen million dollars on the industry 
and the likelihood that the purse seine component of the fishery 
would be shut down and other components faced with major restric-
tions.85 By its determination that the rule was not a major ruling 
NOAA avoided the requirement under the Federal Regulatory Flex-
ibility Act86 that an analysis of alternatives to the proposed rule to 
tion rights, NMFS stated: "[t]his course of action would ignore the ICCAT recommendations 
of November, 1981 and would be contrary to the international treaty obligations of the United 
States." Id. 
83. The FEIS discussed the alternatives only on the basis of implementing the ICCAT 
recommendation, and did not consider objection to the ICCAT recommendation. Nor was the 
scientific data used as the basis for the moratorium analyzed or questioned. This was particu-
larly unusual in light of comments received from the East Coast Tuna Association raising 
legitimate doubts as to the stock size analysis. See supra note 78. 
84. 47 Fed. Reg. 25,350 (1982) established an effective date of June 10, 1982 and allowed 
for comments on the FEIS on or before July 6, 1982. The rule was made effective one day 
before the thirty day requirement of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) 
(1976). While the required public hearings were held, scoping meetings were not. Scoping 
meetings are meetings with interested industry groups and state agencies and are required by 
regulations of the Council on Environmental Quality. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (1982). Curiously, 
NOAA concluded at 47 Fed. Reg. 12,368 (1982) that "scoping meetings ... were held by 
the agency on two occasions." However, as the record showed, and as was conceded by 
the government at oral argument and in its brief, these meetings were in fact informational 
meetings held by Representative William Carney in Long Island, New York, and Representa-
tive Edwin B. Forsythe in Toms River, New Jersey, to hear constituent concerns regarding 
amendments to the Magnuson Act to include tunas. Opening Statement of the Honorable 
William Carney (Montauk, New York) January 7, 1982; The News Chronicle (Moorestown, 
New Jersey) March 4, 1982, at 17. 
85. FEIS, supra note 81, at 25, 80. Presidential Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 3d (Feb. 1981), 
requires that a regulatory flexibility analysis accompany all major rules and identify "any 
significant alternative to the proposed rule which accomplish the stated objectives of applica-
ble statutes and which minimize any significant economic impact of the proposed rule on small 
entities." See 5 U.S.C. § 603(c) (Supp. IV 1980). 
86. 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-611 (Supp. IV 1980). Section 601 requires the agency to draft a 
regulatory flexibility analysis if the rule has a significant impact on small entities, including an 
identification of significant alternatives to the proposed rule which would tend to minimize 
such economic impacts. NMFS stated that "all of the entities affected by the proposal are 
small businesses or small organizations." Curiously, NMFS concluded that "therefore, alter-
natives are not examined with respect to mitigating the impacts on those entities relative to 
each other." NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, NAT'L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADM. 
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minimize economic burdens be developed and discussed. NOAA, 
therefore, made no attempt during the rulemaking to consider alter-
natives that would ease likely economic burdens. 
During the course of its rulemaking, NOAA avoided the provisions 
of another federal procedural statute designed to draw the coastal 
states into the federal decisionmaking process, the Coastal Zone 
Management Act of 1972 (CZMA).87 The CZMA, administered by 
NOAA, contains the requirement that federal agencies conducting 
activities do so in a manner consistent with state coastal zone man-
agement programs. It also contains provisions for the mediation of 
disputes between state and federal agencies over inconsistent feder-
al actions in state territorial waters.88 By not supplying Massachu-
setts with a consistency determination, NOAA avoided the CZMA 
requirement. The statute otherwise would have provided coastal 
states the opportunity to affect the implementation of the ICCAT 
recommendation with respect to their territorial waters. 
In addition, of most concern to the coastal states, NOAA did not 
allow states such as Massachusetts a reasonable time in which to pro-
mUlgate state regulations implementing the ICCAT recommenda-
tion within their own territorial waters.89 Section 971 of ATCA re-
DRAFT ENVT'L IMPACT STATEMENT 26 (Apr., 1982). The Small Business Administration, which 
is charged by statute to oversee proper compliance with this requirement, categorized 
NMFS's action by stating: "we believe this to be an overly narrow reading of the (Act's) re-
quirements." Letter from Frank S. Swain, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, to NMFS (May 24, 
1982) (on file with author). 
87. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1972 & Supp. IV 1980). The Coastal Zone Management Act re-
quires that federal agencies conducting activities which directly affect the coastal zone do so in 
a manner, to the "maximum extent practicable consistent with approved state management 
programs." 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(I). The definition of coastal zone includes "coastal waters." 16 
U.S.C. § 1453(a). 15 C.F.R. 930.34(a) (1983) places an affirmative burden on federal agencies 
to "provide state agencies with a consistency determination at the earliest practicable time in 
the planning or reassessment of the activity." The Coastal Zone Management Act and im-
plementing regulations are administered by NOAA, and NMFS's obligation to adhere fully to 
the federal consistency regulations was noted by NOAA: "As a result, meticulous attention 
must be paid to this requirement within NOAA, since our own attitude and actions will 
naturally be an example for the rest of the federal government." Memorandum of William 
Brewer, NOAA General Counsel, to Robert W. Schoning, Director, and others (June 7,1977). 
Regarding the failure of Massachusetts to receive a federal consistency determination see Af-
fidavit of Joseph E. Pelczarski (July 21, 1982) (on file with author). 
88. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1456(c)-1456(d) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
89. 47 Fed. Reg. 25,360 (1982), codified at 50 C.F.R. 285.1(d)(1982), preempted the authori-
ty of Atlantic coastal states over territorial waters without waiting the reasonable period 
of time as set forth in 16 U.S.C. § 971(d). These regulations contained the determination 
by the Assistant Administrator of NMFS that the regulations were to apply within the ter-
ritorial waters of Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, 
Delaware, New Jersey, New York, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Maine, Puerto Rico and 
the Virgin Islands. 
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quires that after the promulgation of federal regulations implement-
ing an ICCAT recommendation NOAA allow states a reasonable 
period of time to promulgate state regulations implementing the rec-
ommendation in territorial waters.90 This provision, in effect, pre-
cludes the application of federal authority within waters under direct 
state control so long as the state regulations are consistent with and 
otherwise implement the ICCAT recommendation. In fact, NOAA 
had allowed such a reasonable time in past rulemakings implement-
ing ICCAT recommendations.91 By not allowing a reasonable time 
for the states to implement the ICCAT recommendation, it appears 
that NOAA improperly preempted state authority contrary to the 
statute and past NOAA actions. 
The implementation of the recommendation by NOAA had serious 
economic consequences for the domestic Atlantic bluefin tuna fisher-
man who was prohibited, for all practical purposes, from continuing 
traditional commercial fishing for the Atlantic bluefin tuna. In fact, 
operations of many individual fishermen, particularly the purse 
seiners, were shut down. Wholesale distributors of Atlantic bluefin 
tuna who shipped directly to the Japanese markets were prohibited 
from satisfying these markets. Tourist revenues generated in coastal 
areas in the form of charter boat and party boat fees were affected 
as well. 
Exacerbating the fishermen's bitter feelings regarding the swift-
ness and lack of notice preceding the ICCAT recommendation was 
the manner in which NOAA ran roughshod over procedural statutes 
designed to involve the industry in the decisionmaking process of the 
rulemaking. This was particularly true of NOAA's deliberate disre-
gard of proposed alternatives to the moratorium that would lessen 
the economic harm that was to follow its regulations. As a result, 
90. 16 U.S.C. § 971(g) authorizes the federal preemption of state waters after notice to the 
affected state and opportunity for a hearing if a state "has not, within a reasonable period of 
time after the promulgation of regulations pursuant to this chapter, enacted laws or pro-
mulgated regulations which implement any such recommendation of the Commission within 
the boundaries of such state." 
91. When implementing the last recommendation of the Commission in 1975 NMFS in-
formed the Commonwealth of Massachusetts: "Federal regulations governing Atlantic bluefin 
tuna, initially effective only in Federal waters beyond the three mile limit, will take effect in 
state waters if, within a reasonable period of time after their promulgation, the state does not 
implement regulations of comparable effectiveness." Letter from Robert Schoning, NMFS 
Ass't Adm. to Gov. Michael Dukakis (May 24, 1976). In clarifying the determination made by 
NMFS of the application of federal regulations in state waters, NOAA again stated "we must 
wait for a reasonable period of time after our own regulations are in effect before making this 
determination." Letter from NOAA's Chief Counsel for Living Marine Resources to NMFS 
Acting Assoc. Dir. for Resource Management (February 25, 1976). 
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two separate law suits were filed by aggrieved fishermen92 in an at-
tempt to restrain the operation of the rule and to obtain a declaration 
that the ICCAT recommendation itself was invalid.93 
The following section discusses the litigation and shows how the 
domestic fishing industry was further frustrated in its efforts to 
secure some form of relief. The section intends to show that the in-
ability to obtain judicial review of international management deci-
sions further supports the conclusion that Atlantic bluefin tuna 
should be managed on a domestic basis within the framework of the 
Magnuson Act. 
VI. LITIGATION: THE FERRANTE CASE 
Prior to the initiation of the rule making process which would nor-
mally precede a final decision, the management decision for a two-
year moratorium had already been made. It must be emphasized that 
the end result, a domestic regulation imposing a moratorium on an 
entire industry, was a fait accompli as soon as the ICCAT recom-
mendation was finalized in Miami, Florida. Thereafter, the public 
notice, hearing, and comment processes and all domestic procedural 
statutes designed to afford interested parties an opportunity to af-
fect the decision were rendered meaningless in effect. To be sure, 
NOAA went through some of the technical motions. 94 NOAA, how-
ever, refused to acknowledge any discretion in the rulemaking. In 
addition, NOAA's previous actions evading requirements Df such 
procedural statutes as the Coastal Zone Management Act, the Regu-
latory Flexibility Act, and the National Environmental Policy Act95 
left little doubt in the public's mind as to NOAA's intention to imple-
ment the ICCAT recommendation summarily. 96 Herein lies the 
92. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts intervened as an Amicus curiae. 
93. A.A. Ferrante Fishing Corp. v. Allen E. Peterson, Jr., No. 82-1872-T (D.C. Mass. filed 
July 2, 1982); Sea Rover Fishing, Inc. v. Dep't of Commerce, No. 82-1814 (D.C. Cir. filed June 
29, 1982). 
94. 47 Fed. Reg. 12,367 (1982) Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact State-
ment; 47 Fed. Reg. 17,086 (1982) Notice of Proposed Rule; 47 Fed. Reg. 14,501 (1982) Notice 
of Public Meetings. 
95. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1969 & Supp. IV 1980). The National Environmental Policy Act 
requires that alternatives to the proposed action be thoroughly discussed in the Environmen-
tal Impact Statement, and that the public be given an early and meaningful opportunity to par-
ticipate in and affect the deliberative process. See also 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.7, 1508.14. 
96. 47 Fed. Reg. 25,350 (1982) states: 
"The Act directs the Secretary of Commerce to promulgate regulations necessary to 
implement recommendations adopted by the International Commission for the Con-
servation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) and to carry out the purposes and objectives of 
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major flaw with international management of Atlantic bluefin tuna: 
a decision having major economic repercussions on the domestic fish-
ing industry may be made without prior notice; the basis for that 
decision may be formed in some other part of the world not accessi-
ble to the fishermen; and there is no prospect of assurance that the 
implementing authority in the United States will take any action 
other than implementing the recommendation in its entirety. 
Frustrated by both the surprising swiftness of the ICCAT recom-
mendation and the lack of accountability for the rulemaking through 
which it was implemented, aggrieved parties filed suit in the United 
States District Court to challenge the implementation of that recom-
mendation. In A. A. Ferrante Fishing Corp. v. Allen E. Peterson, 
Jr.,97 the plaintiffs, a domestic purse seine fisherman of Atlantic 
bluefin tuna and a fish wholesaler who purchased Atlantic bluefin 
tuna for shipment to Japan, sought a temporary restraining order 
against the operation of the rule implementing the ICCAT recom-
mendation; a reinstitution of the regulations that were in effect prior 
to the 1981 ICCAT recommendation; and a declaration by the court 
that the ICCAT recommendation itself was invalid as being neither 
developed in accordance with the Convention nor implemented in ac-
cordance with ATCA. 
The plaintiffs' suit in Ferrante raised the following legal issues: 
first, was there a valid ICCAT recommendation; and, second, if so, 
must it be and was it implemented in accordance with domestic pro-
cedurallaw? The underlying question, intrinsic to the problems of in-
ternational management, was the extent to which a party can obtain 
judicial review of an international recommendation which has poten-
tially severe domestic economic impacts and imposes significant do-
mestic fines and penalties for non-compliance, when that recommen-
the Convention." NMFS concludes: "Thus NMFS is legally obliged to implement the 
ICCAT recommendation, both as a result of NMFS' responsibilities on behalf of the 
U.S. under the treaty and on behalf of the Secretary of Commerce under the tunas 
Act." 
FEIS, supra note 81, at 78. 
97. No. 82-1872-T (D.C. Mass. tiled July 2,1982). In addition to the Ferrante case, a similar civil 
action was simultaneously commenced in the Federal District Court for the District of Colum-
bia. Sea Rover Fishing, Inc. v. Department of Commerce, Civil Action No. 82-1814 (D.C. Cir.). 
The District Court of Massachusetts transferred Civil Action No. 82-1872-T for consolidation 
with Civil Action No. 82-1814 in the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Subsequent to this transfer, the original plaintiffs in Sea Rover 
filed a voluntary motion to dismiss. Civil Action No. 82-1814 was thereupon dismissed without 
prejudice by the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia. 
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dation is implemented by rule making conducted with no opportunity 
for industry involvement in the decisionmaking process.98 
The plaintiffs did not prevail in Ferrante. The Federal District 
Court for the District of Columbia held that a temporary restraining 
order of the type sought would intrude deeply into the core concerns 
of the executive branch, which through the Department of State, had 
approved ICCAT's international recommendation. The court re-
quired the plaintiffs to meet an extraordinarily strong showing of 
success on the merits. Upon the plaintiffs' failure to meet this high 
burden, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary 
restraining order. 99 
The Ferrante case raises many of the problems inherent in the cur-
rent management of the Atlantic bluefin tuna. The following sec-
tions of this article will discuss in detail the legal issues raised in that 
litigation. 
A. The Parties' Arguments 
In challenging the effectiveness of the ICCAT recommendation, 
plaintiffs argued that the recommendation resulting from the 
foreign government consultations in Miami, Florida, was nothing 
more than a trilateral agreement reached between three contracting 
parties to the Convention which was prematurely approved by the 
State Department before it was ratified by the full ICCAT Commis-
sion. Plaintiffs also argued that the recommendation was approved 
by the State Department prior to the public hearing requirements of 
ATCA, thereby negating the public's ability to alter the recommen-
dation through the public hearing process, and that the recommen-
dation was not formally transmitted by the Commission to all of the 
contracting parties as required by the Convention. 1oo 
98. 16 U.S.C. § 971e(e)(l) provides civil penalties for violations of the regulations of not 
more than $25,000 for the first offense and not more than $50,000 for any subsequent of-
fenses. During the week of August 15, 1982 a Gloucester, Massachusetts handgear fisherman 
was cited by NMFS enforcement agents for allegedly catching three giant Atlantic bluefin 
tuna in violation of 50 C.F.R. § 285.32(a) which established a catch limit of one tuna per week. 
Nat'l Marine Fisheries Servo Press Release (Aug. 23, 1982). This case was concluded before an 
Administrative Law Judge of the United States Department of Commerce on July 29, 1983. 
The Judge imposed a civil fine of $150,000 for four violations. In The Matter of James Britton 
No. 244-139, 244-149 (July 29, 1983). 
99. A.A. Ferrante Fishing Corp. V. Allen E. Peterson, Jr., No. 82-1872-T (D.C. Mass. filed 
July 2, 1982). 
100. Plaintiffs argued: 
"The quota that it is imposing on the U.S.-based commercial bluefin tuna fishery is 
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Plaintiffs further focused directly on the issue of foreign vessels in 
the United States two-hundred-mile waters, thereby challenging the 
international management framework itself. In support of this 
challenge plaintiffs noted that ATCA requires NOAA to assess the 
nature and effectiveness of the measures taken by other ICCAT con-
tracting parties to ensure compliance by that country's fishermen 
with past ICCAT recommendations. ATCA also requires that NOAA 
issue a statement along with the final rule containing the results of 
the assessment.101 The fishermen pointed out that there was no such 
statement accompanying the rulemaking in this case. 102 Based on 
the facts known to NOAA which tended to show that the Japanese 
were not fulfilling their ICCAT commitments, plaintiffs implied that 
the issuance of such a required statement could have shown that the 
not an lCCAT recommendation under that statute. It is a voluntary self-imposed limit 
negotiated among the United States, Japan, Canada and Brazil. NMFS has ignored 
the substantive and procedural requirements of the Tunas Act and the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, as well as the National Environmental Policy Act, the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 12291." 
Brief for Plaintiffs at 11, A.A. Ferrante Fishing Corp. v. Allen E. Peterson, Jr., No. 82-1872-T 
(D.C. Mass. filed July 2, 1982). The argument continued by stating: "Unless the limits agreed 
upon in February 1982 by four nations are submitted to lCCAT, subjected to Article VIII's 
process, transmitted to this nation by lCCAT, and favorably acted upon by the Secretary of 
State, NMFS has no legal authority to implement those limits under the Tunas Act, as it 
claims." Id. at 13. At the time of the litigation there was nothing in defendant's administrative 
record submitted to the court to show favorable action by the full Commission of the Miami 
consultations or a written transmittal letter to the Contracting Parties. See supra text and 
notes at notes 69, 74, 75. 
101. ATCA requires that the rulemaking be accompanied by "a statement, based on in-
quiries and investigations, assessing the nature and effectiveness of the measures for the im-
plementation of the commission's recommendations which are being or will be carried out by 
countries whose vessels engage in fishing the species subject to such recommendations within 
the waters to which the Convention applies." 16 U.S.C. § 971d(c}(2) (1982). 
102. The preamble of the final rule stated in pertinent part: "Officials agreed to recommend 
to their governments the following measures for 1982 and 1983 to implement the lCCAT 
recommendations on Atlantic bluefin tuna management in the western Atlantic Ocean." The 
preamble concluded that: "Japan implemented the lCCAT recommendation for its nationals 
on March 3, 1982, and Canadian regulations will be in place before bluefin fishing commences 
in Canadian waters." 47 Fed. Reg. 25,351 (1982). 
The rule continued by stating: 
Id. 
"Officials also agreed to recommend to their governments ... measures to imple-
ment the lCCAT recommendations on Atlantic bluefin tuna management in the 
western Atlantic Ocean ... Officials also agreed to recommend to their governments 
that they immediately initiate steps necessary to implement the management 
measures agreed upon in these consultations ... Under lCCAT, each member nation 
has the responsibility to implement lCCAT recommendations for its own nationals. 
NOAA's legal authority under the Atlantic Tunas Convention Act is limited to im-
plementing recommendations of lCCAT through regulations pertaining solely to the 
domestic fishery." 
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Japanese fishing effort posed a serious threat to the achievement of 
ICCAT recommendations.103 If such a showing could be made, they 
argued, the Secretary of Commerce pursuant to ATCA could sus-
pend the regulations. 104 
The plaintiffs, however, failed to emphasize to the Ferrante court 
that international management of marine fisheries requires that 
each participating nation be assured that the remaining nations are 
mutually complying with the particular ICCAT recommendations. 
Without cooperative uniformity, one nation's fishermen will profit at 
the expense of fishermen from another nation, and overall resource 
management will suffer due to a decreased effectiveness of the 
recommendation. In this case, the evidence before NOAA suggested 
that past voluntary efforts of the Japanese to restrict their catch to 
recent levels of fishing mortality, as required by the 1975 ICCAT 
recommendation, had been unsuccessful. In addition to this ex-
cessive catch rate, further information available to NOAA evidenced 
significant underreporting of catch rates by the Japanese.105 Despite 
these two statistical indications, the proposed and final NOAA rules 
did not contain the required statements assessing the effectiveness 
or lack thereof of past measures taken by the Japanese to adhere to 
the 1975 ICCAT recommendation. The above facts suggest that had 
the required statement been made and issued together with the 
regulation, which had the effect of shutting down the United States 
Atlantic bluefin tuna industry, the United States would appear to 
have been undermining its own fishing industry for the benefit of 
foreign interests. 
While the statutory requirement to make such a statement might 
be considered by some to be a technicality, others regard it as a more 
103. Japanese longline catch in numbers of Atlantic bluefin tuna in 1975 was 7,995, jumped 
to 24,277 in 1976, and was 30,558 in 1977. ATLANTIC BLUE FIN TUNA RESOURCE UPDATE, supra 
note 61, at 15. 
104. 16 U.S.C. § 971c (1976). 
105. A report issued by NMFS in 1982 concluded: 
"Another serious problem is the differences between the Japanese reported catch 
rates and the catch rates computed from observer data. For example, six out of seven 
catch rates reported by the Japanese for the Atlantic and five out of the seven re-
ported rates for the Gulf of Mexico were lower than catch rates calculated from 
observer records. For the majority of these, the Japanese reported catches were 
significantly lower than those reported by the observers. These differences are ap-
parently real. Observers aboard the vessels have compared their daily catch records 
with those maintained by the Japanese, and in almost every instance, they reported 
that the Japanese catches are less than those they recorded." 
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serious statutory violation. The domestic fishing industry is not in a 
position to ascertain the degree to which other contracting parties 
comply with prior ICCAT reccommendations. Only NOAA has the 
ability to monitor this requirement, which is critical to the effec-
tiveness of any ICCAT recommendation. Congress was no doubt 
aware of this when it imposed upon the agency the duty to make the 
necessary investigations and issue an appropriate statement regard-
ing its findings. The omission of this statement was particularly im-
portant here: NOAA, upon effectively putting the domestic fish-
ermen out of business, should have informed the fishermen of any 
consistent or inconsistent conservation efforts by other contracting 
parties. 
The government's argument in Ferrante relied almost entirely 
upon considerations of foreign policy and international relations. 
The government first noted that the court should be cognizant of the 
fact that the rulemaking arose within a political context. The govern-
ment argued that under the Administrative Procedure Act the prop-
er scope of judicial review of procedural errors in the implementation 
of the ICCAT recommendation was whether the agency action was 
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in ac-
cordance with law.106 The government then proposed the novel 
theory that the court's review of the procedural improprieties should 
be "tempered" because of the foreign policy implications underlying 
the regulations.107 The government argued that judicial review of 
the substantive issues was limited to determining whether the 
rulemaking was consistent with the ICCAT recommendation. 
Responding to the plaintiff's challenge to the United States' 
overall quota and the Secretary of State's refusal to object to the 
rule, the government stated that both claims were rooted in foreign 
policy and international considerations and were therefore not 
susceptible to judicial review.108 In a supplemental memorandum, 
the government asserted that the critical issue in the litigation was 
whether there could be judicial review of the Secretary of Com-
merce's consultation with the Secretary of State on whether to ob-
NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMlNISTRATION, JAPANESE LONGLINE FISHING, 35 
(1982) 
106. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2XA) (1976). The government cited Environmental Defense Fund v. 
Costle, 657 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1981), and City of Westfield v. FPC, 551 F.2d 468 (1st Cir. 
1979) for this highly deferential standard of judicial review. 
107. Brief for Defendants at 18-20, A.A. Ferrante Fishing Corp. v. Allen E. Peterson, Jr., 
No. 82-1872-T (D.C. Mass. filed July 2, 1982). 
108. Id. at 18. 
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ject to the ICCAT recommendation. l09 The government concluded 
that both the political question doctrine and the doctrine of agency 
action committed by law to agency discretion were applicable to the 
case, and that either one was sufficient to support a finding of 
nonreviewability.110 
In response to the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining 
order, the government asserted that a stay of the regulations on any 
grounds would place the United States in violation of its interna-
tional obligations to manage Atlantic bluefin tuna and would be con-
trary to its international treaty commitments under the ICCAT Con-
vention. l11 Plaintiffs replied that a stay of the regulations would not 
be inconsistent with United States international agreements to im-
plement the recommendation since the recommendation itself stated 
that its provisions should be implemented in accordance with the 
regulatory procedures of each country.112 Plaintiffs contended that 
if they could establish the existence of procedural irregularities in 
their preliminary motion to enjoin, a stay of the regulations would 
have been consistent with the language of the recommendation. 
B. The Case Law Relied Upon by the Parties 
The parties cited two different cases as governing the proceedings 
for preliminary relief before the district court. First, the plaintiffs 
cited Hopson v. Kreps,113 in which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
held justiciable the issue of whether the International Whaling Com-
mission exceeded its jurisdiction under the International Whaling 
Convention.1 l4 The government relied on Jensen v. National Marine 
Fisheries Service (NOAA), 116 in which the District of Columbia Court 
109. Supplemental Memorandum for Defendants at 3, A.A. Ferrante Fishing Corp. v. Allen 
E. Peterson, Jr., No. 82-1872-T (D.C. Mass. filed July 2, 1982). 
110. Brief for Defendants at 19-20, A.A. Ferrante Fishing Corp. v. Allen E. Peterson, Jr., 
No. 82-1872-T (D.C. Mass. filed July 2, 1982). 
111. [d. 
112. The fifth recommendation stated: "That the Governments of Canada, Japan and the 
United States take steps to implement these provisions as soon as possible and simultaneously 
in accordance with the regulatory procedures of each country." Letter from O. Rodriguez-
Martin, ICCAT Executive Secretary to the Secretary of State (July 20, 1982). If, as the 
government alleged, implementation of the ICCAT recommendation was a "crucial" effort 
necessary to conserve the bluefin stocks, NOAA should have given meticulous attention to all 
domestic procedural law . See Brief for Defendants at 20, A.A. Ferrante Fishing Corp. v. Allen 
E. Peterson, Jr., No. 82-1872-T (D.C. Mass. filed July 2, 1982). 
113. 622 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1980). 
114. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, December 2, 1946, 63 Stat. 
1716, T.I.A.S. No. 1849, 4 Bevans 248. 
115. 512 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1975), 
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of Appeals held that the Secretary of State's decision not to object to 
regulations proposed by the International Halibut Commission was a 
political question and was therefore not justiciable.u6 Unfortunate-
ly, the Ferrante court decided the case on the issue of the threshold 
burden of proof for preliminary relief, and therefore offered little 
guidance on the applicability of the political question doctrine, or the 
proper role of judicial review of international decisions regarding the 
management of highly migratory marine fisheries. 
The Jensen case, decided in 1975, involved an action by plaintiffs 
seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the en-
forcement of a regulation adopted pursuant to the International 
Pacific Halibut Convention.u7 The Convention provided that regula-
tions approved by the Pacific Halibut Commission must receive the 
approval of the President in order to be effective in the United 
States. The Jensen court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the 
action for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the President's approval 
of the regulations constituted agency action committed by law to 
agency discretion, and was therefore nonreviewable under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act.us Unlike Jensen, however, the Fer-
rante case did not involve Presidential approval of regulations 
adopted by a bilateral international Commission. Ferrante, while in-
volving State Department approval of an international recommenda-
tion, was in essence a federal agency rule made after opportunity for 
notice and comment. Jensen is distinguishable from Ferrante be-
cause it did not involve rulemaking; judicial review of the interna-
tional recommendation in Jensen was appropriately barred by the 
Administrative Procedure Act since it involved Presidential action in 
the field of foreign affairs. The Jensen court correctly held that 
Presidential approval of an international recommendation which 
116. Convention for the Preservation of the Halibut Fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean 
and Bering Sea, March 2, 1953, United States-Canada, 5 U.S.T. 5, T.I.A.S. No. 2900. 
117. The Northern Pacific Halibut Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 772-772j (1937), provides criminal 
penalties for the violation of any regulation established by the Commission. 
118. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1976). The court stated that "presidential action in the field of 
foreign affairs is committed to presidential discretion by law." 512 F.2d 1189, 1191 (1975). 
The court cited Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 
103, 68 S.Ct. 431, 92 L.Ed. 568 (1948), and United States v. Curtis-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 
304,57 S.Ct. 216, 81 L.Ed. 255 (1936), and concluded that "it follows that the APA does not 
apply to the action of the Secretary in approving the regulation here challenged." (The 
Presidents' authority was delegated to the Secretary of State by Executive Order No. 11467, 
May 1, 1969, 34 Fed. Reg. 7271). 512 F.2d 1189, 1191 (1975). The court clarified its holding by 
stating that a political question does not present a case or controversy within the meaning of 
Article III of the Constitution. [d. 
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proscribed certain domestic activity constituted a foreign affairs 
decision committed to executive discretion by law. 
At issue in Ferrante, however, were federal agency regulations 
promulgated pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act. These 
regulations allegedly were necessary and appropriate to carry out an 
international recommendation. Thus, the agency's exercise of discre-
tion in defining the substance of the regulations in Ferrante was en-
titled to judicial review, whereas Presidential approval of a recom-
mendation committed by law to his discretion does not afford judicial 
review of the substance of that recommendation. Therefore, agency 
promulgation of regulations is not political in nature as is the execu-
tive approval of a recommendation. The appropriate scope of judicial 
review in the Ferrante case should have been whether the regula-
tions of the Secretary of Commerce were arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law.119 
In support of its nonjusticiability claims in Ferrante, the govern-
ment also cited the Ninth Circuit case of United States v. Decker.120 
The Decker case, like Jensen, involved regulations developed by an 
international body, the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Com-
mission.121 The Commission's regulations, like those of the Pacific 
Halibut Commission in Jensen, required executive approval to be ef-
fective in the United States. There were no agency rulemaking pro-
visions governing implementation of the regulations. The Decker 
court noted that the case before it, like Jensen, involved regulations 
119. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2XA) (1976). 
120. 600 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1979). In its brief the government noted: "the court of appeals 
stated that it might be better to characterize Jensen as holding that the Executive's decision 
not to file an objection was unreviewable as 'agency action committed to agency discretion by 
law' rather than as being simply based on the political question doctrine. We believe that both 
nonreviewability doctrines apply to the facts of the instant action, but of course, either is suffi-
cient to support a finding of nonreviewability." Supplemental Memorandum of Defendants at 
4, A.A. Ferrante Fishing Corp. v. Allen E. Peterson, Jr., No. 82-1872-T (b.C. Mass. filed-Ju1y 
2, 1982). 
121. Convention for the Protection, Preservation and Extension of the Sockeye Salmon 
Fisheries of the Fraser River System May 26, 1930, United States-Canada, 50 Stat. 1355, 
TS918, 6 Bevins 41. Article I of the Convention established the International Pacific Salmon 
Fisheries Commission. The Commission was authorized to develop regulations to achieve suffi-
cient escapement of salmon each year to conserve the stocks, and to allocate the allowable 
catch between Canada and the United States. Article VI provides that the regulations must be 
approved by each government. The Sockeye Salmon or Pink Salmon Fishing Act of 1947 
makes it unlawful in the United States to violate any regulation of the Commission. 16 U.S.C. 
S 776(a) (1976). Appellants in Decker were salmon fishermen challenging their convictions for 
violating the regulations. The government argued that the political question doctrine pre-
cluded judicial review of the regulations under which plaintiffs were convicted. 
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promulgated by an international Commission established by a con-
vention between the United States and Canada.122 Nevertheless, the 
Decker court distinguished Jensen on the grounds that the latter case 
involved a claim that executive approval of the international regula-
tions was arbitrary. The Decker court concluded that "[i]n those few 
cases involving interpretation of treaties when the political doctrine 
precludes review, that doctrine has narrow confines. The principal 
area of nonjusticiability concerns the right of the executive to 
abrogate a treaty."123 
In Ferrante, no issue of the executive abrogation of a treaty arose; 
therefore the issues of nonjusticiability raised in Decker should not 
have influenced the outcome in Ferrante. However, the Decker court 
did review the authority of the executive to approve partially the in-
ternational regulations by construing the treaty, the effect of the 
Commission's emergency order, and the lack of the Canadian gov-
ernment's approval of the regulations. Thus, the Decker court did re-
view issues having foreign policy implications; the Ferrante court, 
therefore, could have conducted a similar review of the administra-
tive rulemaking record before it even though foreign policy consider-
ations were involved. What was before the court in Decker and 
Jensen was the international recommendation itself as approved by 
the executive, and not, as in Ferrante, a regulation promulgated by 
an administrative agency pursuant to a rulemaking procedure. This 
is an important distinction that apparently escaped the attention of 
the Ferrante court. Furthermore, the Decker court did not avoid 
review of the executive's action on the international recommenda-
tion. The Ferrante court therefore had no justification on the basis of 
the Decker decision for not reviewing an agency rule implementing 
an international recommendation. 
In 1980, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals clarified the Decker 
holding in the case of Hopson v. K reps. 124 Hopson, cited by plaintiffs 
in Ferrante, involved a controversy arising from the international 
122. 600 F.2d 733, 777 (9th Cir. 1979). 
123. Id. In a footnote the court referred to the language of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 
S. Ct. 691, 7 L. Ed.2d 663 (1962): 
"[I]t is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign rela-
tions lies beyond judicial cognizance. Our cases in this field seem invariably to show a 
discriminating analysis of the particular question posed, in terms of the history of its 
management by the political branches, of its susceptibility of judicial handling in the 
light of its nature and posture in the specific case, and of the possible consequences of 
judicial action." 
600 F.2d. 733, 737-738. 
124. 622 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1980). 
1983] BLUEFIN TUNA 49 
management of the bowhead whale under the 1946 International 
Whaling Convention.125 Article V of the Convention authorized the 
International Whaling Commission to establish a detailed set of reg-
ulations, or "schedule." The Whaling Convention Act of 1949 pro-
vided that the regulations of the Commission were to be submitted 
for publication in the Federal Register and would become effective 
with respect to all United States whaling vessels in accordance with 
the terms of the schedule and the provisions of the Convention.126 
The particular question before the Hopson court was whether the 
Commerce Department had exceeded its authority in promulgating 
the regulations. The court concluded that resolution of the issue 
merely required a determination of whether the agency had ex-
ceeded its statutory authority, a question that was clearly suscepti-
ble to judicial review.127 The court noted that when a treaty is not 
self-executing, it is the implementing legislation and not the treaty 
itself, which operates as the law of the land.128 Thus, despite the ex-
istence of a treaty, the Hopson court held that the plaintiff did not 
lack jurisdiction to seek review of the validity of the Commerce 
Department's implementing regulations. 129 
125. International Whaling Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, December 2, 1946, 
62 Stat. 1716, T.I.A.S. No. 1849, 4 Bevans 248. The Convention established the International 
Whaling Commission and vested in it the authority to establish protected and unprotected 
species, open and closed seasons, open and closed waters, size limits, fishing methods, and 
gear restrictions to govern the international whaling industry. 
126. 16 U.S.C. §§ 916-9161 (1970). There are no provisions in the Act for notice and com-
ment opportunities prior to publication. The Act authorizes the Secretary of the Department 
of Commerce to "adopt such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes and ob-
jectives of the convention, the regulations of the Commission, this chapter and with the con-
currence of the Secretary of State, to cooperate with the duly authorized officials of the 
government of any party to the Convention." 16 U.S.C. § 916j. 
127. 622 F.2d 1375,1378-1379 (9th Cir. 1980). Plaintiffs also contended that the Commerce 
Department issued the regulations in violation of the procedural and substantive requirements 
of the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1407 (1972), and the Endangered 
Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1973). 
128. 622 F.2d 1375, 1381 (9th Cir. 1980), citing Z&F Assets Realization Corp. v. Hull, 311 
U.S. 470 (1941). The court noted: "The emphasis placed on the relationship between the grant 
of power and the conduct of American foreign policy lends support to the view that the nature 
of the grant of power is an important consideration in resolving issues of reviewability." 622 
F.2d 1375, 1381 (1980). 
129. 622 F.2d 1375, 1382 (9th Cir. 1980). The court was reluctant to address this issue, 
noting that it "raises substantial questions as to the proper reconciliation of the holdings [in 
Decker and Jensen]." "Although Decker does not specifically address a reviewability conten-
tion, we were willing in that case to look behind the Secretary's decison to accept the treaty 
regulations of an international commission at least to the extent of determining whether he 
had accepted them in accordance with the terms of the treaty." Id. In a footnote, the court 
distinguished administrative power to accept regulations of an international Commission that 
50 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 11:11 
The Hopson court clarified its holding in Decker by noting that the 
question of whether or not the schedule was lawfully approved by the 
executive and therefore enforceable pursuant to the Whaling Con-
vention Act did not constitute a nonreviewable political question 
simply because review would require the interpretation of a treaty or 
have a potential impact on United States external affairs.180 The 
court found support for this conclusion in Baker v. Carr,181 in which 
the Supreme Court provided the following six-factor inquiry for 
determining when a case with foreign affairs implications should be 
considered a nonreviewable political question: 
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political 
question is found: a textually demonstrable constitutional com-
mitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or ... 
a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for 
resolving it; or ... the impossibility of deciding without an in-
itial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discre-
tion; or ... the impossibility of a court's undertaking independ-
ent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coor-
dinate branches of government; or . . . an unusual need for un-
questioning adherence to a political decision already made; or 
. .. the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pro-
nouncements by various departments on one question.132 
Relying on this language in Baker, the Hopson court rejected the 
government's assertion that executive approval of the schedule was 
nonreviewable under Baker simply because the executive historically 
had managed the bowhead whale. 
In both Hopson and Ferrante, plaintiffs challenged the validity of 
regulations of the Department of Commerce under the enabling 
statutes pursuant to which those regulations were made effective in 
is conferred by a treaty and power that is conferred by a statute. In the Ferrante case, unlike 
Decker, the power was conferred by statute. 
The court declined to affirm the judgment of the lower court on the alternative ground ad-
vanced by the government that the Secretary of State's decision not to object to the Commis-
sion regulations was action which the Whaling Convention Act committed to his unreviewable 
discretion. The court refused to do so noting that the issue was neither briefed by the parties 
nor fully addressed by the district court. For a discussion of this holding and its impact on the 
political question doctrine see Roberts, Bowhead Whales, Alaskan Eskimos, and the Political 
Question Doctrine, 9 HASTINGS CONSTIT. L.Q. 231-255 (1981). 
130. 622 F.2d 1375, 1378 (9th Cir. 1980). 
131. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
132. Id. at 217. Although the Baker case concerned domestic affairs, the Supreme Court 
nonetheless engaged in a political question analysis. The Court noted that questions of foreign 
relations "frequently turn on standards that defy judicial application, or involve the exercise of 
a discretion demonstrably committed to the executive or legislature" and often "uniquely de-
mand single-voiced statement of the Government's views." Id. at 211. 
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the United States. Furthermore, plaintiffs asserted in both cases 
that the Department of Commerce had violated provisions of other 
domestic statutes in the process of making the regulations effective. 
The Hopson case clearly was applicable to the situation presented in 
Ferrante. Unfortunately, instead of applying Hopson, the Ferrante 
court applied another case, Adams v. Vance,133 in which the court 
held that a party must be able to make an extraordinarily strong 
showing of success on the merits in order to obtain temporary provi-
sional relief. Relying on the Adams decision, the Ferrante court 
denied plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order enjoining 
the operation of the 1982 NOAA rule. 
Ferrante is distinguishable from Decker and Jensen since the 
power to accept the international recommendation in Ferrante was 
conferred by statute. An important fact relied upon by the Hopson 
court was whether the power to accept was granted pursuant to a 
treaty or a statute. In Ferrante, the international recommendation 
was translated into law only after agency rulemaking with opportu-
nities for notice and comment. In that case, the rulemaking was the 
subject of review, and not an international recommendation ap-
proved by the executive. Thus, the court could have reviewed the ad-
ministrative record compiled in the course of the agency rulemaking 
process. The Hopson court's holding that the International Whaling 
Commission's actions under the International Whaling Convention 
were subject to judicial review certainly applies to Ferrante .. Under 
Hopson, the Ferrante case is clearly justiciable and susceptible to 
judicial review. 
Instead of reviewing the validity of the agency rulemaking process 
the Ferrante court abrogated its duty to settle an issue of statutory 
construction simply because foreign policy implications were in-
volved. Thus, judicial review was denied even though the record dis-
closed gross procedural errors, agency noncompliance with statutes 
designed to include the public in the decisionmaking process, and 
agency refusal to release relevant information to the public. The 
mere existence of an international treaty ought not be enough to pre-
clude judicial review; the political question doctrine should not be in-
voked when its application would render an entire case nonjustici-
able by independently applying the Baker criteria and finding them 
applicable to the facts. In the management of highly migratory 
species, the federal agency charged with the duty of implementing 
133. 570 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
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an international management recommendation through rulemaking 
should not be allowed to deliberately circumvent domestic pro-
cedural statutes designed to involve the regulated industry in the 
decisionmaking process. 
The Ferrante court's stance on these issues, however, was 
ultimately unclear. The district court's opinion in Ferrante, issued 
the day after oral argument, held that the plaintiffs had failed to 
make an extraordinarily strong showing of success on the merits and 
denied the motion for a temporary restraining order, without ad-
dressing the political question doctrine or review of the procedural 
allegations. 
C. The Ferrante Court's Holding: 
Description and Analysis 
Instead of relying on Hopson, the Ferrante court based its ra-
tionale on the case of Adams v. Vance. 134 The Adams case involved 
an action to compel the Secretary of State to file an objection to 
regulations adopted by the International Whaling Commission. A 
special consideration noted to be weighing against plaintiffs in 
Adams was the fact that an objection would substantially endanger 
the foreign relationships of the United States. The Adams court felt 
that application of the discriminating analysis set forth in Baker 
would be difficult in the case before it because deadline pressures 
had resulted in an abbreviated record and incomplete briefing of all 
issues.135 The Adams court then vacated an order of the district 
court requiring the Secretary of State to object to the recommended 
regulations. The court explained that any party seeking injunctive 
relief which "deeply intrudes into the core concerns of the executive 
branch" would have to make an "extraordinarily strong showing" to 
obtain such relief. 136 The court found that the plaintiffs in Adams 
had failed to make such a showing. 
Skirting the issue of justiciability, the Adams court further denied 
plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order against the en-
forcement of the regulations. 137 The court noted, however, that 
134. [d. 
135. [d. at 954. 
136. [d. The circuit court cited Mitchell v. Laird, 159 U.S. App. D.C. 344, 488 F.2d 611 
(1973), in which the court found that a request for an order directing action by the Secretary of 
State in foreign affairs plainly constituted an "intrusion into the core concerns of the ex-
ecutive branch." [d. 
137. 570 F.2d 950, 955-956 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
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there was little dispute that the plaintiffs had presented serious legal 
questions tending to show a substantial case, particularly with re-
spect to the government's failure to consider possible alternatives to 
the proposed action. 13S The court did not review the issue of the 
government's alleged failure to comply with certain domestic stat-
utes, including the National Environmental Policy Act, because it 
felt that plaintiffs' request for an injunction requiring the Secretary 
of State to object to the international recommendation constituted 
an improper remedy. 
In contrast to the plaintiffs' prayer for relief in Adams, the plain-
tiffs in Ferrante did not request an injunction requiring the 
Secretary of State to object to the ICCAT recommendation; thus, 
plaintiffs' action in Ferrante did not amount to an intrusion into the 
core concerns of the executive. The Ferrante plaintiffs requested 
only a stay of the regulations and a reinstitution by NOAA of the 
1981 regulations pending judicial review of the rulemaking record 
and the merits of the case. 139 Assuming that the balance of equitable 
factors favored such an injunction,140 the remedy requested in Fer-
rante merely would have preserved the status quo. The "extraordi-
narily strong showing" required by the Adams court to enjoin the 
Secretary of State to take affirmative action should not have applied 
to judicial review of the rulemaking record in Ferrante. 
The issue in Ferrante was domestic in nature: it was brought by 
domestic fishermen to restrain the operation of a federal rule pro-
scribing certain activities of the domestic fishing industry, and was 
based on an allegation that the rule was outside the scope of the 
enabling statute and in violation of numerous other domestic stat-
utes. To suggest, as did the district court, that the plaintiffs were re-
quired to make an "extraordinarily strong showing" in order to ob-
tain the requested relief is an incorrect application of the Adams case 
and a clear abrogation of the court's traditional function of judicial 
review. In holding that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden 
under the extraordinarily strong showing standard the court skirted 
138. [d. at 955. 
139. The Ferrante court stated that the plaintiffs "challenge the entire process by which the 
regulations were placed in force as being not in accordance with law and suggest that the 
regulations superseded by those at issue, i.e. the 1980-81 regulations, should be reinstated." 
Ferrante v. Peterson, No. 82-2163, 3 (D.C. Cir. filed June 29, 1982). 
140. The judge in Ferrante found that the plaintiffs "have demonstrated that they are likely 
to suffer immediate and irreparable injury if a preliminary injunction is not granted." [d. at 5. 
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review of the political question doctrine as well as the fishermen's 
appeal for judicial relief. 141 
Plaintiffs in Ferrante did not seek an order directing the Secretary 
of State to object to the ICCAT recommendation; the plaintiffs 
framed the legal issues and the remedy sought in such a way as to 
render the extraordinarily strong showing standard inapplicable. 
Reinstitution of the 1981 regulations merely would have maintained 
the status quo pending litigation. And although the Ferrante court 
acknowledged that the Hopson case "appears to go farther than any 
other case in holding that environmental regulations adopted pur-
suant to treaty are not immune from judicial scrutiny solely because 
they are political," it nevertheless failed to apply that case in 
reaching its decision.142 
The Ferrante case may be read as standing for the proposition that 
plaintiff fishermen challenging the validity of domestic regulations 
promulgated to implement an international recommendation are un-
likely to obtain interim relief pending judicial review of the adminis-
trative rule making record. The court's refusal to provide judicial 
review, merely because of potential foreign policy implications, con-
stitutes an inappropriate abrogation of its traditional function of 
reviewing questions of statutory authority. 
D. The 1982 [CCAT Developments 
In November, 1982, approximately four months after the district 
court issued its opinion in Ferrante and while the case was still pend-
ing judicial review on the merits, ICCAT held its third special 
meeting in Funchal, Madeira Island, Portugal.143 On the basis of a 
new SCRS study, the Commission approved an increase in the an-
nual allowable catch of Atlantic bluefin tuna in the western Atlantic 
to 2,660 mt, an increase of 1,500 mt over the allocation approved at 
the 1982 Miami, Florida meeting.144 As a result, the United States 
141. Ferrante v. Peterson, No. 82-2163, 5 (D.C. Cir. filed June 29, 1982). The court failed to 
respond to plaintiff's allegations that no valid recommendation with formal ICCAT approval 
resulted from the joint consultations of the three contracting parties, noting only that "[iJf the 
Secretary possesses authority to prohibit bluefin fishing altogether, a fortiori, he possesses 
authority to prohibit less than all unless it would be contrary to an ICCAT recommendation." 
[d. at 6. It would be unreasonable for the Secretary to act at all in the absence of a valid recom-
mendation. 
142. Ferrante v. Peterson, No. 82-2163 (D.C. Cir. filed June 29, 1982). 
143. Report of the United States Delegation to the Third Special Meeting of ICCAT, Office 
of International Fisheries Affairs, National Marine Fisheries Service (November 24, 1982). 
144. The SCRS committee met for thirteen days immediately preceding the ICC AT 
meeting. The Commission was particularly concerned with the last SCRS report (SCRS 81155) 
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quota increased for the 1983 fishing season from 605 mt to 1,387.3 
mt; Japan received a quota of 699.4 mt; and Canada's quota became 
573.3 mt.145 While the 1,387.3 mt United States quota was not as 
high as the pre-1981 quota of approximately 2,000 mt, it did go a 
long way toward easing the economic burdens on the domestic At-
lantic bluefin tuna industry while remaining consistent with the con-
servation goals of ICCAT. Nonetheless, NOAA implementation of 
the 1981 moratorium had a significant impact on the domestic Atlan-
tic bluefin tuna industry. 
Curiously, the government in Ferrante added insult to injury by fil-
ing a supplemental memorandum incorporating the new ICCAT rec-
ommendation. The government wrote that if the Secretary of Com-
merce could not promulgate regulations implementing an ICCAT 
recommendation until after the six month period as provided in Arti-
cle VIII of the Convention, which was suggested by plaintiff fisher-
men in Ferrante, it might not be possible to have any new regula-
tions in place by the time the 1983 domestic Atlantic bluefin tuna 
fishing season began.146 In so doing, the government appeared to be 
threatening the fishermen with a continuation of the moratorium. 
However, the ICCAT recommendation had been approved by the 
Commission in November, and the domestic Atlantic bluefin tuna 
fishing season was set to begin in June. This would have been suffi-
cient time for the agency to promulgate new regulations. 
VII. DOMESTIC IMPACTS OF INTERNATIONAL 
MANAGEMENT OF ATLANTIC BLUEFIN TUNA 
Examined within the context of the 1981 ICCAT recommendation 
and its implementation by NOAA, the government's continuing sup-
port of its juridical position on highly migratory species indicates 
that a fishery management decision having severe economic reper-
cussions on the domestic fishing industry may be made in some other 
regarding Atlantic bluefin tuna: 
"in that its scientific findings constituted a range of possibilities without a clear con-
clusion. Fourteen papers on bluefin tuna were considered by SCRS, and two opinions 
emerged generally representing work submitted by U.S. scientists on the one hand 
and Japanese scientists on the other. The SCRS report concluded that the assessment 
on which its 1981 recommendations were based could no longer be 
used because of changes in the historical data base reported during 1981-82 and 
because the stock recruitment relation used is now considered to be 'erroneous'." 
Id. at 2, 3. 
145. Report of the United States Delegation, supra note 135, at l. 
146. Supplemental Memorandum for Defendants at 2, A.A. Ferrante Fishing Corp. v. Allen 
E. Peterson, Jr., No. 82-2163 (D.C. Cir. filed June 29, 1982). 
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part of the world without affording industry representatives an op-
portunity to participate in that decision. Furthermore, NOAA takes 
the position that such recommendations may be implemented 
through rulemaking procedures that fail to take into account legiti-
mate alternatives, economic factors, the soundness of the biological 
data used, or the application of other domestic procedural statutes 
designed to create industry participation in the rulemaking process. 
That plaintiff fishermen may, for all practical purposes, be precluded 
from securing judicial review of such decisions due to foreign policy 
considerations underscores the need for a domestic rather than an 
international management framework. Specifically, decisions having 
a pervasive domestic impact should be made within a domestic 
framework. International management of Atlantic bluefin tuna and 
the present United States juridical position on highly migratory 
species no longer serve the public interest.147 
Implementation of the 1981 ICCAT recommendation completely 
displaced the commercial purse seine fishermen and severely dis-
rupted the commercial handgear fishermen148 by imposing restric-
tive daily quotas and making the search for the fish more expensive 
than the value of the fish caught. The recommendation also had a 
negative impact on the ability of domestic tuna dealers to satisfy 
Japanese markets. The two-year moratorium was conservatively 
estimated by NOAA to cost the domestic Atlantic bluefin tuna in-
dustry fourteen million dollars.149 Since, the moratorium was only in 
place for one year, a logical estimate suggests that it may have cost 
the industry approximately one half that amount. 
NOAA's improper preemption of the coastal state authority and its 
failure to afford them a reasonable period of time to implement the 
ICCAT recommendations arguably violated the provisions of ATCA. 
Its actions certainly contravened the legal position it expressed in 
the prior agency implementation of the 1974 ICCAT recommenda-
tion. At a minimum, the NOAA's action constituted an arrogant ex-
ercise of ostensible federal power at the expense of the coastal 
states' traditional authority over their respective territorial waters 
147. For a discussion and conclusion that the juridical position of the United States on 
highly migratory species is weak see Rasmussen, The Tuna War: Fishery Jurisdiction in In-
ternational Law, U. ILL. L.R. 744-755 (1981). 
148. Commercial handgear fishermen use hand held lines, rods and reels, and harpoons to 
catch tuna. 
149. See supra text and note at note 77. 
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and a violation of basic principles of cooperative federal-state 
management of Atlantic bluefin tuna. 
The international management of Atlantic bluefin tuna to date has 
done inequitable harm to domestic fishermen. The international 
framework has exempted countries that harvest Atlantic bluefin 
tuna in the western Atlantic, such as Brazil and Cuba, from the con-
servation provisions of the 1981 recommendation. By effectively au-
thorizing Brazil's fishery to expand, this exemption also appears to 
contradict directly the 1974 recommendation limiting fishing mortal-
ity to recent levels. Moreover, there are no mechanisms to assure 
that other countries, such as Japan, adhere to the ICCAT recommen-
dation or sanction their fishermen for violating international quotas. 
Currently, some foreign fishermen may enter waters within the 
United States two-hundred-mile fishery conservation zone and 
harvest Atlantic bluefin tuna as they please. 
In implementing the 1981 recommendation, NOAA, under the 
guise of foreign policy and international relations, has effectively 
foreclosed from participation in the rulemaking process parties that 
have traditionally taken part in the conservation and management of 
the resource, such as the domestic fishing industry and coastal 
states. Furthermore, by interpreting ATCA in such a way as to re-
quire a mechanical implementation of any ICCAT recommendation, 
NOAA has excluded any discretion in its rulemaking, thereby 
eliminating its accountability for both the recommendation itself and 
its implementation. 
In the past courts have recognized, to varying degrees, the govern-
ment's continuing and historical use of the political question doctrine 
as a defense to legal challenges to international recommendations. 
This recognition represents a tacit acknowledgement that interna-
tional resource management decisions are in fact rooted in political 
considerations. The management of the western Atlantic stock of 
bluefin tuna within such a political framework, is beneficial neither 
to resource conservation goals nor to those whose livelihood depends 
upon the resource. 
In the continuing conservation and management of highly 
migratory species there is always room for cooperative international 
agreements for scientific study and for the establishment of interna-
tional organizations to consider conservation and management rec-
ommendations. I5o Ultimately, however, it is unworkable, particular-
150. See, e.g., the recently enacted Nauru Agreement Concerning Cooperation in the 
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ly in the case of Atlantic bluefin tuna, to endow such organizations 
with management responsibilities or the attributes of national 
regulatory and management entities. 
The 1981 ICCAT recommendation was the first international 
recommendation to manage separately two distinct stocks of Atlan-
tic bluefin tuna. Despite the United States scientists' refusal to 
declare officially that Atlantic bluefin tuna is composed of two sepa-
rate stocks, the species is now managed as such. However, the 
weight of scientific evidence suggests that it may be inaccurate to 
classify a single stock of Atlantic bluefin tuna as a "highly 
migratory" species. If the western stock of Atlantic bluefin tuna is to 
be managed differently than the eastern stock, and if the manage-
ment measures have significant domestic impacts, it is essential that 
the decisionmaking body be held accountable for its management 
decisions. To meet this goal, these management measures should be 
created within a procedural framework that affords an opportunity 
for judicial review. 
During the 1982 congressional session two bills were introduced in 
Congress seeking to include Atlantic bluefin tuna under the authori-
ty of the Magnuson Act which currently excludes highly migratory 
species from domestic management.151 As suggested above,152 the 
adoption of the 1981 ICCAT recommendation forced the domestic 
Atlantic bluefin tuna fishermen to refocus their efforts from lobby-
ing for passage of these bills to challenging the 1981 ICCAT recom-
mendation. Without active support for these bills, they languished in 
committee and were never enacted into law. Should such bills be re-
filed during the 1984 congressional session, Congress should take a 
close look at the current United States juridical position, the needs of 
the domestic fishermen, and the realities of international practice. 
An attempt to bring the United States in line with the majority of 
other countries by exercising authority over highly migratory 
species would be difficult due to the strong lobbying interests of the 
west coast fishermen; however, Congress should take the initiative 
Management of Fisheries of Common Interest, November 6, 1981. Signatory nations include 
Micronesia, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua, New Guinea and the Solomon 
Islands. Article I of the Treaty provides: "The Parties shall seek, without any derogation of 
their respective sovereign rights, to coordinate and harmonize the management of fisheries 
with regard to common stocks within the Fisheries Zones, for the benefit of their peoples." 
These fishery stocks include highly migratory species of tuna. 
151. S. 1564, H.R. 4457, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1982). 
152. See supra text and note at note 58. 
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in formulating a proper legislative position on highly migratory 
species, beginning with Atlantic bluefin tuna. 
The arguments in favor of international management of Atlantic 
bluefin tuna are no longer valid. The 1981 ICCAT recommendation 
constituted nothing more than a trilateral agreement between 
Canada, Japan, and the United States. These three nations, all of 
which are actively involved in the bluefin tuna fishery in the western 
Atlantic, can effectively conserve the western Atlantic stock 
through other means. For example, conservation of the western At-
lantic stock could be achieved through bilateral agreements between 
Canada, Mexico, Japan, and the United States. In fact, such agree-
ments are already operable in other fisheries, such as those for 
halibut and salmon. All countries concerned with the conservation of 
Atlantic bluefin tuna could participate in the management process 
and recommend appropriate conservation measures through inter-
national forums. Furthermore, if the United States were to declare 
unilateral authority over Atlantic bluefin tuna under the Magnuson 
Act, it is unlikely that such a decision would be opposed by those 
countries that were specifically exempt from the 1981 ICCAT rec-
ommendation, such as Brazil and Cuba, or by the vast number of 
foreign nations presently exercising authority over highly migratory 
species; thus there would be no unfavorable reaction to a similar 
United States declaration of authority. 
In short, there are no real advantages to the management of At-
lantic bluefin tuna through an international framework. The estab-
lishment of a two year fishing moratorium is evidence that ICCAT, 
since its inception in 1969, has been vulnerable to political pressures. 
Except for the creation of basic and fundamental minimum size reg-
ulations, it has failed to adopt recommendations that would uniform-
ly conserve and manage the resource on a consistent and stable 
basis. More effective management of the Atlantic bluefin tuna could 
be achieved by observing the following recommendations. 
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DOMESTIC MANAGEMENT 
The Magnuson Act should be amended to bring the Atlantic bluefin 
tuna, if not all Atlantic tunas, within the management authority of 
the United States. The Magnuson Act creates a national fishery 
management program to foster conservation of fishery resources 
within two hundred miles of the United States coastline. 153 This na-
153. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1976). See supra text and notes at notes 32-36. 
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tional program also establishes a comprehensive two-part procedure 
for the adoption of fishery management regulations which is de-
signed to assure adequate public input into the decisionmaking 
process.154 
Most importantly from a management perspective, fishery man-
agement decisions under the Magnuson Act are based on the concept 
of optimum yield, a process that reflects the economic and social 
needs of the fishing industry as well as the conservation of the re-
source.155 In contrast, ICCAT management decisions are based on 
the concept of maximum sustainable yield, a strictly biological 
term.156 Consideration of the livelihood of the fishermen and the 
economic well-being of the fishing industry is vitally important to 
any fishery management decision. The Magnuson Act recognizes 
that in the conservation and management of the resource there are 
implications for and impacts on the fishermen that must be ac-
counted for. This framework is far more responsive and receptive to 
the realities of the domestic fishing industry than is the present in-
ternational framework, and still provides the mechanisms to ensure 
sufficient protection of the resource itself. 
From the perspective of the fishermen, the industry, and the 
coastal states, domestic management under the Magnuson Act of-
fers opportunities for input into the development of the fishery 
management plan at the regional level and the implementation of the 
plan at the federal agency level. For example, the Act would estab-
lish direct industry participation in the regional council decisionmak-
ing process. The regional councils, which have been in existence 
since approximately 1977, are composed of representatives from the 
regulated industries and are currently developing management 
154. The regional fishery management councils must hold public hearings during the 
development of a fishery management plan. 16 U.S.C. § 1852 (1976). The Secretary of Com· 
merce must publish the plan in the Federal Register for comment prior to plan approval. 16 
U.S.C. § 1854 (1976). For a general discussion of the fishery management plan process see 
Rogalski, W., The Unique Federalism of the Regional Councils Under the Fishery Conserva-
tion and Management Act of 19762,9 B.C. ENVT'L AFF. L. REV. 163 (1980). 
155. The Magnuson Act defines optimum yield as "the amount of fish - (A) which will pro-
vide the greatest overall benefit to the Nation with particular reference to food production and 
recreational opportunities; and (B) which is prescribed as such on the basis of the maximum 
sustainable yield from such fishery, as modified by any relevant economic, social or ecological 
factor." 16 U.S.C. § 1802 (1976). 
156. The Convention authorizes the Commission to "make recommendations designed to 
maintain the populations of tuna and tuna-like fishes that may be taken in the convention area 
at levels which will permit the maximum sustainable catch." International Convention for the 
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, March 21, 1969, 20 U.S.T. 2887, T.I.A.S. No. 6767, Article 
III. 
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plans for the fishery resources found within their respective geo-
graphic areas of authority. In the long run, industry participation 
will encourage greater voluntary compliance with the regulations 
and discourage litigation, thereby permitting more effective enforce-
ability of the management plan. 
The management framework offered by the Magnuson Act was de-
signed to regulate domestic fishing activity in a manner both consist-
ent with conservation goals and responsive to industry needs. It is 
beginning to prove itself to be an effective means of regulating other 
commercial fisheries. There is no reason why the Magnuson Act 
should not regulate Atlantic bluefin tuna located within the United 
States two hundred mile fishery conservation zone. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The problems that plague the management of the Atlantic bluefin 
tuna fishery are representative of the deficiencies inherent in the 
present framework of international management of highly migra-
tory species. The current management system places the economic 
burdens of conserving the Atlantic bluefin tuna squarely on the 
shoulders of the domestic industry but provides no guarantees that 
the domestic fishermen who currently bear these burdens will be re-
warded in the future. In addition, there are no mechanisms for 
preventing Mexico, Cuba, Brazil, or even Canada or Japan from 
overfishing the stocks in the unlikely event of stock rebuilding. It is 
unconscionable to require United States fishermen to conserve At-
lantic bluefin tuna when their efforts only enure to the benefit of 
foreign nations and their fishermen. Considering the interests of the 
domestic industry, the coastal states, and conservation policy in 
general, it is no longer appropriate for the United States to continue 
to observe the policies set forth in the ICCAT recommendations or as 
embodied in the Convention. 
